July 11th, 2010

Senior Fellow at WINEP Praises the Late Ayatollah Fadlallah of Lebanon

Mehdi Khalaji, a Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), a hawkish pro-Israel think-tank, wrote the following memoir of his relationship with the late Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah. The article largely stands on its own, and is valuable reading on its right. It is particularly poignant given that CNN’s senior Middle East editor Octavia Nasr was fired for tweeting her regrets on this figure’s passing. The irony of Octavia Nasr being fired from a nominally neutral news outlet for mourning the death of an enemy of the Israeli state while senior staffer of a militantly pro-Israel think tank gets to say that and more without even a thought of losing his job will not be lost on any reader who is not completely blinded by the conventional wisdom in America on the Arab-Israeli dispute.

The translation appears below, followed by the translator’s comments. As a translator, I feel I should say that the transliteration of Arabic/Persian names is a bit of a hodgepodge. I prefer to follow the standard usage to make the translation more readable to the reader who lacks these language skills and to make the page more search-engine friendly.

The original article appears here.

Fadlallah, the Unusual and Unique Faqih

Mehdi Khalaji

The first time I sat with Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah was in Zainabiya, Damascus, in the porch of his home for about two hours. My friend and I, two educated youths from Qom, had heard his voice from afar and were eager to visit him. There was a seminary around his home in Zainabiya where he would go from Beirut for several days each week for years to teach the students.

Of cheerful mien, friendly, humble, and kind, he received us and patiently answered our “infidel-type” questions. Those were years of unequal combat with Ayatollah Khamenei. Ayatollah Khamenei had launched a propaganda war in Qom as well as Lebanon against him.

One of the leading and renown Shiite clerics of Lebanon told me that His Eminence Jaafar Mortaza Amili,  had received a million dollars from His Eminence Khamenei to, in the name of setting up madrasehs, launch a propaganda campaign against Fadlallah in Southern Lebanon. Ayatollah Khamenei saw Fadlallah’s influence and authority as an obstacle to his own political influence in Hezbollah and, indeed, among the Shia of Lebanon and tried to portray him as lacking the power of ijtihad and even having a whiff of innovation about him and violating the well-known principles of Shiism.

The last time was six years ago, when I saw him in his home in Beirut. This time, I went from Europe to visit him. He listened to me with that same simplicity, honesty, and patience he always showed for about two hours and answered my questions. He was very upset by Ayatollah Khamenei. He said, When they declare this man “The Custodian of the World’s Muslims,” doesn’t he ask himself what kind of a meaningless title this is? And how does he expect that all the Shiites would consider him their custodian? And how is such an expectation logical when it comes to the Sunnis? And then his heart bled for the Qom clergy who, as he put it, live hundreds of years behind his times. He said, “I would recite ‘Lord, forgive my people. Indeed, they know not.’

In recent years, nursing an ambition to have an office in Qom, he entered into something of a reconciliation with the Islamic Republic and received its officials and said things which would suit their nature. These same officials, too, nursed an ambition that he should open an office in Qom so that they could use it to keep him sweet and repair the appearance of a relationship with him.

It was as if Ayatollah Khamenei had understood that it was impossible to completely eliminate Fazlallah from Lebanon and Fazlallah, for his part, had agreed that since [as Saadi wrote],

You do not have sharp, lacerating claws
It would be best to infrequently get into fights with beasts.

The money which Ayatollah Khamenei spent in Lebanon was not in the same league as the insignificant income Fadlallah received for his religious wages from his few followers.

In an interview with Ms. Muna Sakariya, he said,

People have said to me, “The problem is not with your opinions and fatwas, but with Kuwaiti dinars and Saudi rials. You might use your religious authority to attract this money to yourself …” It was for this reason that they considered my religious authority a danger.

Second, there was the problem with the religious authority being Arab. They were not very happy with the religious authority being Arab.

Third, my religious authority was a danger for that of His Eminence Khamenei, since my cultural and political perspective was broader than his … They very much wished that the religious authority would remain in Iran, and if they put up with His Eminence Sistani’s religious authority, it was only because Iraq’s peculiar political circumstances gave them no option.

(عن سنوات و مواقف و شخصیات، منی سکریه، دارالنهار، بیروت، 2007، ص. 69)

Fazlallah was a Lebanese faqih. His being Lebanese was not the only feature which showed his ancestry. Rather, his way of thinking and manner of doing fiqh also showed this. Lebanon is a fairground of thought and politics, and the faqih in this intellectual and political display cannot be a scribe like the anti-political faqihs of Najaf or the politics-smitten faqihs of Qom. Fadlallah knew Lebanese society well, like Musa Sadr, and did fiqh based on this knowledge.

During the years of war and beyond, when pious women had no opportunity to marry or saw their opportunities as having slipped away or were far from their husbands, Muhammad Husain Fadlallah declared female masturbation permitted, arguing that masturbation [استمنا] entails the release of sperm and women do not have sperm; but his answer to this request for a fatwa was in essence rooted in expedience:

In our research and review, through the requests for fatwas which had been made of us, we have looked at the depths of the problem under certain circumstances, such as when a woman’s husband is in prison or the woman does not know if her husband is alive or dead, or under circumstances pertaining to being between divorce and the continuation of the marriage, etc.

In the event of the husband’s absence, the commandment for this is well-known, that the wife must wait for four years after which the sharia judge can grant her a divorce, and if her provider gives her her alimony, she must live like this the rest of her life. Or if her husband is exiled to another country for a period which is not ordinarily tolerable and becomes a refugee and is not able to see his wife. [sic]

Under these circumstances, lethal sexual difficulties will appear which compel the faqih to come up with a positive outcome if he can by using the sharia’s logic so as to think up a solution to solve this problem. Naturally, masturbation leads to special problems of its own, but from the point of view of the sharia, abstinence or putting off this problem leaves behind greater problems for the woman’s life, particularly a married woman who has no solution under the sharia to solve her sexual problems.

These are matters which compelled me to study and review the subject in a sharia-responsible fashion.

Similarly, Fadlallah believed that in sexual intercourse, if the man comes but leaves the woman without having reached the peak of pleasure, “he has committed an unethical and inhuman act.”

From these personal matters to political and social issues, Fadlallah was a pragmatist. In the interview he gave to Ms. Muna Sakariyah, he clearly said that he is in agreement with the velayat-e faqih in Iran, since it is in harmony with the Islamic Republic’s system, but is opposed to it in Lebanon, since it is not in harmony with the political realities there. (ibid., pp. 172-173)

Fadlallah was an unusual faqih. He was a poet and had a divan of qasidas and ghazals and discussed his poetry on television with litterateurs. He had many love poems and his poetry was far from that of the religious bazaari. He held conversations with intellectuals. He participated in conferences and seminars and television programs in those days when he was not so broken and exhausted. He discussed with critics of fiqh and religiosity, and when the Sunni sheikhs smote Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid with the fist of takfir, he defended him alongside the other intellectuals of the Islamic world, although he did not approve of his views.

Fadlallah was considered Hezbollah’s spiritual father and even issued fatwas permitting suicide missions, but kept himself removed from party relations. He was revered by the Shia independently of Hezbollah and for precisely this reason he enjoyed unparalleled respect and credibility among non-Shias. Fadlallah was the sole religious Shiite powerhouse of whom there was none more moderate and thoughtful in all of Lebanon. It was for this reason that not only as a Shiite faqih, but as a Lebanese figure that he will enjoy a prominent position in the contemporary history of this country.

Fadlallah was a unique faqih. He was pragmatic, realistic, and moderate in issuing fatwas while being politically hard-line. Fadlallah was a counter-example to the hypothesis that moderate faqihs were necessarily apolitical and secular.

Fadlallah, in comparison with the average age of a normal cleric, left this world early. His death was a great boon for the Islamic Republic and for Ayatollah Khamenei. There is no longer a Shiite religious powerhouse in the way of Hezbollah and, for that matter, Iran’s assault on Lebanon. And now his death will have severe consequences, particularly for the Lebanese Shia. They have no choice but to abandon their traditional powers and form or strengthen modern powers in parties or groups against Hezbollah.

It is impossible to resist consigning Shiism to Hezbollah in Lebanon using some other religious authority. Lebanon’s Shiite society has no choice but to take seriously the formation of political and modern institutions. The disappearance of Musa Sadr and the death of Fadlallah have uprooted the hopes in religious authorities of Lebanon’s Shia society, a society which wants to break from Hezbollah and preserve its tribal and religious character in Lebanon and act within the framework of the country’s national interest.

The national mourning in Iran for Fadlallah has taken on the form of shameless fraud. Qom’s faqihs who had anathemized him in their lessons and ordered that notices saying, “God’s curse upon the killer of Fatima al-Zahra” to be pasted everywhere as an allusion to cursing him, are now satisfied. [In Shiite historiography, the killers of Fatima al-Zahra, the daughter of the Prophet Mohammad and husband of Imam Ali, were supposed to have been Umar ibn al-Khattab, who assaulted her while she was pregnant, leading to her death months later. The recitation of this event in all its horror is part of Shiite martyrology. Evidently this is a reference to Sheikh Fadlallah's having reached out to the Sunnis.]  The Islamic Republican government is now relieved of the burden of spending money to outflank Fadlallah.

[end of translation]

The article somewhat trims the ayatollah’s beard a bit. He died an implacable foe of the Israeli state. Reuters reported, “[A]  nurse asked Ayatollah Fadlallah what he needed. Without hesitation, he replied, ‘For the Zionist entity to cease to exist.’” He was commonly believed to have been involved in the bombing of the Marine and French paratroopers barracks in 1983 and the CIA tried to assassinate him him using a high-powered car bomb which narrowly missed killing him, but did kill 80 people and wounded hundreds of others.

The last paragraphs also seem politically skewed. After the June 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war, it would surprise me to think that the Lebanese Shia feel that an Iranian onslaught is their biggest problem and that Hezbollah is the enemy against whom they have to organize. I would imagine it is quite the opposite: That the Lebanese Shia see Hezbollah as a source of power and the Islamic Republic of Iran as powerful ally. Saying this brings me no satisfaction, but it seems pretty clearly to be the truth.

http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/142050.html
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March 15th, 2010

Amnesty International Falls for the Taraneh Mousavi Hoax

AI’s First Report on the Hoax
On December 2009, I read on an Amnesty International website that this organization was taking up the Taraneh Mousavi hoax. This alarmed me, since it was playing with AI’s reputation and that of the broader struggle for human rights in Iran.  I wrote a message to AI expressing my concerns in the text box provided on its site. I received a timely and courteous response from Drewery Dyke , who has been Amnesty International’s researcher on Iran since 1999, about a week later.

I responded the next day.

There followed a day or so of trying to arrive at a time we could converse. This proved to be difficult. After not hearing from AI for six weeks, I tried to reestablish contact.

All I received in response was an out of office message. I sent one last message and heard from AI no more.

The Hoax Integrated into AI’s Report
While pondering what to do next, I noticed that Amnesty International has come out with a report on the events in Iran after the June 2009 elections titled Iran: Election Contested, Repression Compounded. The report has its own weaknesses. Although for the most part it is a damning indictment of the crackdown on civil liberties launched after the elections by Iran’s ruling military-clerical clique, it seemed to me to lack the professional quality one comes to expect from Amnesty International, the gold standard of human rights groups. There was the odd mistranslation (narm afzari means software, not intellectual). More seriously, there are too many “was said to have’s” and undocumented statements. (“In the hours following the closure of the polls, the Ministry of the Interior was said to have confidentially informed Mir Hossein Mousavi that he had won.” (p. 17))
Most disturbing to me was its continuing the above-mentioned indefensible championing of the Taraneh Mousavi hoax, to which it devotes an entire section. (pp. 42-43) This section begins:

On 28 June, 28-year-old Taraneh Mousavi, along with upwards of 2,000 other demonstrators, went to the Ghoba Mosque, north-central Tehran, where they intended to take part in a commemoration for those killed in the then ongoing unrest, in the context of a pre-arranged commemoration for a prominent figure killed in 1981.

This is not what the report’s sources say. In these sources, she was depicted as a bystander who was caught up in the repression because she went into the Qoba Mosque to say hello to a friend (or, in an allied blog, she was arrested for her looks.) (By the way,  how does the blogger know that she went to the mosque to talk to a friend? Was s/he observing her movements? How do we know that the basijis arrested her because of her looks? This magic insight into a character’s thought-processes are tell-tale signs that we are dealing with a piece of fiction.) The English-language translation of a source that AI did not quote (Iranian-e Chap–this blog has been eliminated and the account survives on the websites affiliated with the Worker-Communist Party of Iran) does have her being a participant in the demonstration. The sources AI cites do not, and this is not how the story has come to be accepted by its upholders.

The report continues:

From information collected by Amnesty International, it appears that around five hours after her arrest she disappeared. An anonymous telephone call several days later informed her parents that she had been raped, had tried to commit suicide and had been taken to Emam Khomeini Hospital in Karaj. On arrival at the hospital her parents found that she had not been registered at the hospital. They were told that someone fitting Taraneh Mousavi’s description had been seen by a nurse, but that she had been taken away while unconscious. In the following days, unconfirmed reports suggested that Taraneh Mousavi had been tortured at Evin Prison, but it was unclear when this may have been.

The report does not mention the nature of this “information collected by Amnesty International”. Were these the same “unconfirmed reports” on which the story of her torture is based? And where did these “unconfirmed reports” themselves come from? The report continues:

Eighteen days after her arrest, on around 16 July, unnamed officials reportedly informed her parents that a burned corpse resembling Taraneh Mousavi’s description had been found in the scrubland between Karaj and Qazvin.

Who “reportedly” had this information? The report is silent on this point.

The original source of this story comes from a group of bloggers who “took up” (or invented) her case, on July 17, according to AI. In fact, zeerzamin took up the case July 13, after which it was parroted by cherikonline, the only primary sources AI gives for the case. (We will discuss these sources further below.) Amnesty International’s report on the affair concludes with the unsubstantiated allegation “Taraneh Mousavi’s mother was later removed from her house and reportedly taken by the authorities into ‘protective custody’”. This is mentioned by no blogger I am aware of, and in any case in unattributed. It was not mentioned in AI’s December report on the subject mentioned above either.

We now pass to the bloggers whom AI sourced in its report, as well as the blogger who possibly initiated this hoax and which AI does not cite.

Source 1: The Online Guerilla
Cherik Online (the Online Guerrilla) is a blogger located in the West. (His date entries are entirely in the Western calendar, something unthinkable inside Iran). We know nothing more of him than that he admires Dostoyevsky’s maxim that when he was in prison, he realized that solitude was more valuable than freedom. He has a record of “breaking” stories based on his own uncorroborated self as a source, some of which are quite ridiculous. Thus, in one issue, he reported that Ahmadinejad consulted Indian fortune tellers while visiting that country. No other press source had uncovered these secret séances, but the Online Guerrilla, from his perch in Europe, sniffed it out!
CherikOnline’s particular stock in trade are his private insight into the secrets of the Iranian military, mostly concerning the imminent disintegration of the repressive forces. He said that the Iranian government was organizing a provocation against the Basij in which an explosion would cause massive casualties. He claimed that many soldiers and members of the security service were fleeing their posts, not wanting to attack the demonstrators. In a similar vein, he claimed that a major leader of the Revolutionary Guards was being disciplined for refusing to lead his forces against the people. This was a story which was widely echoed, including, initially, by myself.  It was shown to be completely false when this officer leveled a violent threat against the demonstrators and showed that he was full of enthusiasm for head-breaking. When the truth came out, our guerrilla complained that the circulation of the story as a rumor and its ultimate discrediting was part of a psychological war against the opposition. There was, of course, no thought of taking responsibility for having launched this baseless rumor himself. After all, it was circulated in his own name. Along the same lines, he published a “letter” from members of the repressive forces urging former Revolutionary Guard commander and conservative presidential candidate Mohsen Rezai to continue to protest against the government. Of course, no such letter ever surfaced. These stories, and dozens more like them, are presented on the sole authority of the blogger, who, again, claims to have access from his station in the West to privileged information from Iran, information of which no sources inside of Iran seem to have any knowledge.
I have spent more time on my blog reporting about cherikonline’s role in perpetrating the Taraneh Mousavi hoax than I care to think, and the reader is referred to these articles. In a lengthy attack on Iranians who doubted the Taraneh Mousavi story, this blogger argued that it was impossible to reveal the whereabouts of Taraneh Mousavi’s family, since this would jeopardize them (and this, despite saying in which district of Tehran they lived and what her father’s profession is!) Yet in a recent post, he writes,

The Green Movement has held gatherings for many of the its martyrs on their fortieth. If there is any inclination to gather for the fortieth of Taraneh Mousavi’s passing and this is officially announced over the media at the Green Movement’s disposal, CherikOnline will publish the address of Taraneh Mousavi’s house.

So after all the protestations that CherikOnline cannot reveal its sources because of security considerations, it offers to blow everyone’s cover if the Green Movement would officially recognize its story!

Source 2: The Underground Sock Puppet
Zeerzamin is another blog apparently published in the West. (Like CherikOnline, it uses the Western calendar.) Its blogger openly admits that his blog had been set up to spread the Taraneh Mousavi story, and so one cannot consider it to be an independent source. It would be as if a blog set up specifically to spread the story that Vincent Foster had been murdered by Hillary Clinton was cited as a source of information about this rumor. In most cases, a blog is the source for a story. In this case, the story is the source for a blog. One of its articles actually criticizes those who won’t take the story seriously because it has no sources. Um, yeah.

Source 3: Omid Habibinia’s Rape Fantasies
The third source, which AI does not cite, presumably because he had taken down the website on which he had posted his Taraneh Mousavi stories several months ago, was Iranian-e Chap (Leftist Iranians). This was a group founded by Omid Habibinia. He played a central role in setting this hoax in motion, and so his credibility should also be examined.
Habibinia seems partial to rape stories. He published another such story featuring a beautiful young Iranian woman with her face barely fuzzed out. She is not talking—it is a photograph, but a recording of her voice tells of a harrowing experience of sexual terror in Iran’s prisons. An audio engineer who posted on this story considers it a fake. The story itself is fantastic, and is similar to the Taraneh Mousavi story in that it features Iranian émigrés in Europe getting access to the intimate details of the suffering of Iranian female prisoners in Iranian prisons. Habibinia claims that he was in communication with this woman for a month, during which he urged her to open up and tell the world about her sexual torment. It is entirely unclear why she would have contacted Habibinia and not a professional human rights organization to tell her story. This story, unlike the Taraneh Mousavi story, has a minor following, although it has found some popularity on websites catering to rape fantasists. (These sites contain shocking, upsetting, and offensive material.)
Along these lines, it is interesting that on his Persian and English blogs, Habibinia published only four articles dealing with Iraq and two of them deal with the use of Iraqi girls (more likely girls posing as Iraqi girls) as models in American rape videos. (This site contains shocking, upsetting, and offensive material.) The viewer of this page will note that he does not shrink from displaying these pictures on his blog, all the while tut-tutting about them.
A Final Comment
One more comment on the use of these sources by AI. It seems clear to me from Drewery Dyke’s questions in his December message to me as well as AI’s report saying that Cherik Online and Zeerzamin had merely taken up the story and brought it to the attention of the opposition’s leadership that AI had no idea of what the story’s actual sources are. In addition, the citing of the sources is entirely vague–no link to a specific issue, simply references to the blogs as a whole. And, finally, it seems abundantly clear that due diligence was not done in vetting the sources. No sensible person who reads them with any attention could find them credible. But without these sources, the story crumbles to the ground.

من آنجه شرط بلاغ است با تو می گویم
تو خواه از سخنم پند گیر و خواه ملال

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March 7th, 2010

Bare Naked Liars

I thought my viewers might find the following interesting.

An Islamophobic site titled Bare Naked Islam carried the following photo:

Now, any fool would suspect that this picture had been photoshopped. I mean, really, if Code Pink had called for the murder of American troops, wouldn’t they have brought public catastrophe on their heads?

After less than a minute on Google, I found the following at Sadly No, which located the original photo and even exposed the people who photoshopped it.

(Nicely done, by the way!)

So I, as a good citizen, alerted the good people at Bare Naked Islam to the error of their ways, not once, but twice. After they deleted my post the first time, I screensaved it the second time in anticipation of their next move.

I did not have long to wait for their next move:

(Notice the time on the lower right side of the computer screen.)

Boo-ya!

Somewhere in Hell, Stalin is blushing…

PS: The Bare Naked Liars are poor sports…

Now you see it,

and now you don’t! (This time it only took them about a minute.)

And now I’m going to enjoy the Bare Naked Ladies.

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February 21st, 2010

Iranian Cyber Army

Translator’s Introduction:

What follows is an article I was asked to translate. Midway through the translation, it occurred to me that it was marred by unsubstantiated statements and exaggerations.

Thursday, 29 Bahman 1388 [February 18, 2010]

Report on the Operation of the Cyber Army in Hacking Websites

by Farvartish Rezvaniyeh

Source: http://www.kaleme.com/1388/11/29/klm-11615

During the past few months, the activities of the Iranian Cyber Army have been noted by the Iranian and even the international media. The theory that these hacker groups are connected to the Iranian government was strengthened when, after several sites were hacked, they issued warnings to the Green Movement. The scope of the measures taken by the Cyber Army discredits the theory that a group of Ahmandinejad’s admirers spontaneously carried out such acts. These messages and the nature of the sites chosen for attack indicate that there are hidden hands which support the Cyber Army.

A review of the political messages published by this group in recent months and the official statements of a government administrator of Iran’s aviation industry in defense of the Cyber Army provide a reason for a closer examination of Iran’s Cyber Army, research about which had heretofore claimed was composed of Russian hackers whose base was outside of Iran. But what is the Iranian Cyber Army and where is it based? Before considering these details, a few preliminaries are necessary.

Attack on Twitter

On the morning of Friday, 28 Azar 1388 [December 19, 2009], connection with the website Twitter was cut in some parts of the world and those who tried to access it were  transferred to a message in English which read:

U.S.A. Think They Controlling And Managing Internet By Their Access, But THey Don’t, We Control And Manage Internet By Our Power, So Do Not Try To Stimulation Iranian Peoples To….

NOW WHICH COUNTRY IN EMBARGO LIST? IRAN? USA?

WE PUSH THEM IN EMBARGO LIST ;)

Take Care.

Attack on Baidu

On the morning of Tuesday, 22 Dey 1388 [January 12, 2010], the website Baidu, the largest Chinese search engine, was hacked. In a message on it, it was written: “The Iranian Cyber army has been launched in protest against intervention by foreign and Zionist sites in our country’s domestic affairs and the spreading of lying and divisive news.”

These measures concluded in a cyber war between Iran and groups of Chinese hackers, called the Honker Union for China, hacked official internet bases of the Iranian government, including the president’s official website and that of the Leader.1

Attack on Radio Zamaneh

On 10 Bahman 1388 [January 30, 2010], The Iranian Cyber Army hacked the website of Radio Zamaneh, changing its front page to a picture of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s flag and the slogans “Ya Hosein (aleihum salam)” and “Persian Gulf”, under which it was written,

If the Leader commands, we attack

If he asks, we sacrifice ourselves

If he wants us to be patient and steadfast

We will sit down and take it in stride.

On 23 Bahman 1388 [February 12, 2010], those who tried to access the site of Jaras News, which publishes news of the Green Movement, were faced with this message from the Iranian Cyber Army on its front page:

Out of respect for the referendum which was held on 22 Bahman [February 11, 2010] and the people who voted and out of respect for the great nation and country named Iran … do not be a tool of those who live safe and sound in America and are using you as a tool.

A Prank on the Iranian Cyber Army

On 16 Bahman 1388 [February 5, 2010], the website Khodnevis, which is administered by Nikahang Kosar, wrote in the satirical column “False News”:

In an amazing and unprecedented step, the Iranian Cyber Army hacked the Mehrabad Airport portal so that those who try to access this site, namely airport workers, are directed to the Raja Rail Company when they type in its URL. It is said that the attack occurred in the early hours of the night and continued into Saturday, facing the airport with a serious crisis. The sudden occurrence of dozens of air accidents in the skies over Tehran as a result of the tower’s air traffic control communications systems’ failure was considered the most important danger which followed this attack, threatening the capital of Iran. Although experts believe that this attack was done by mistake and the technical difficulties were fixed an hour later, the Iranian Cyber Army, after hacking the Mehrabad portal, placed a flag of the Islamic Republic of Iran with a blue color [instead of the green color, which is the at the top of the tricolored flag], along with a message reading, “The Iranian Cyber Army warns all mercenaries who would sell-out their country that they will not be safe even in the skies.”

This satire, which was based on an altered version of part of the real message of the Iranian Cyber Army when it hacked Radio Zamaneh, was quickly reflected on Iranian news sites. A few hours later, the rumor spread of a mistaken attack by the Iranian Cyber Army on a government website became a means of ridiculing this group. Although a few hours later, these sites wiped this news from the various sites on which it had appeared, the rumor continued to spread, to the point that some large companies immediately signed multi-year contracts with internet security groups to strengthen the firewalls of their websites.

The Reaction of a Government Administrator

On 18 Bahman 1388 [February 7, 2010], only two days after this rumor spread, Morteza Dehqan, the acting manager of Tehran’s Mehrabad Airport, in the process of denying the attack on this airport’s site in the course of a discussion with a group of journalists, called it news blackmail, saying,

When foreign agents failed to achieve their filthy ends after the elections, they tried to concoct a conspiracy based on an attack on Tehran’s international airport in order to disrupt the country’s security atmosphere, while no such attack occurred on the airport’s website’s portal and this news is a pure lie from start to finish. It is clear that the counter-revolutionary media has discovered the Iranian Cyber Army’s power and, out of fear of its power, wishes to launch accusations through which it can divert public opinion.

Nikahang Kawsar, who had already stated on his site Khodnevis that this news was a rumor, now, after the publication of the interview with the acting administrator of Mehrabad Airport, wrote in part of his report about this event, “ … When Mehrabad Airport’s acting administrator denied the report about the attack on that airport’s website, he defended the Cyber Army’s record, and we realized that our fake news had done its job. An official officer of the Islamic Republic defended the Cyber Army in such a way that it seems that this group is led by the [Islamic Republican] system.”

On Iranian Hacker Groups

During the past eight years, many groups of hackers were formed in Iran of which the most famous are Ashianeh, Shabgard, and Simorgh. These groups freely attacked various websites by taking advantage of the lack of implementing the laws of punishment current in Iran, in order to win fame as well as out of rivalry with other groups.

Following the rise in reports about hijackings of Iranian government websites and the spread of news in this regard, intelligence agencies became interested in the power of hacking tools and began their widespread efforts to control and guide such attacks.

Security and intelligence organizations, inviting infiltration groups’ cooperation, got them to identify and counteract opponents in the internet and form intelligence groups to control the flow of their information. Some time later, these people also taught hacking techniques to military technicians.

The Formation of the Iranian Cyber Army

The group Ashiyaneh was one of the first to join the circle of government infiltrators and set about wrecking the sites of the Islamic Republic’s opponents with the cooperation of the best hackers. Reports of this group’s activities were published in government media, such as Voice and Vision, Keyhan, and IRNA and were noticed very soon.2

Teaching the Military to Hack

Alongside the hacker group activities, supposedly private companies were organized as well whose primary duty was to recruit infiltrating forces, instruct military forces in cyber attacks, and prepare the necessary resources for such attacks. These companies were charged with training infiltrators and carrying out hacking projects for the Iranian Cyber Army. In the meantime, these companies would import technology needed by Iran’s security forces from Dubai. Among the managers of these companies is the son of one of the senior security officers who, utilizing his father’s connections, has been busy for years working with the military and security forces.3 After the formation of a company through the military budget, he has been busy recruiting expert Iranian infiltrators and, having formed a professional and firm group, has begun to accept cyber control projects in Iran and infiltrators for the government.

How Group Members Are Chosen

The plan for the formation of an Iranian Cyber Army was raised in 1384 [2005] in the Revolutionary Guards, but with the increase in propaganda against the ninth government, its execution was sped up. A while later, a very broad group was formed, the number of whose members reached more greater than a few. The Cyber Army’s unit for recruiting human resources works as follows: After recognizing a professional hacker, it contacts him and threatens him that if he does not cooperate, he will be sent off to prison.

Relationships and information of individuals are so controlled that even most of the group members are not yet aware of their collaboration with the Cyber Army. Considering the use of geniuses, the scientific level of the Cyber Army is very high, and considering the high record of activities of the infiltrators in Iran the power of this army in achieving its goal is comparable to similar groups which operate in the American and Israeli intelligence agencies. It is worth saying that the Center for Struggle with Organized Cyber Crime (the Sepah’s cyber troops) is composed of the same people.

In Ordibehesht 1388 [May 2009], Fars news service reported that the foundation Defense Tech, which is an American military and security agency, called Iran one of the five countries with the most powerful cyber forces, based on figures received from the CIA. This foundation declared that the Iranian Cyber Army’s budget is 76 million dollars, emphasizing that it is monitored by a group from the Revolutionary Guard’s cyber supervision team.4

A Short Time to Execute Instructions

Iran’s Cyber Army has so far not been able to breach the servers of the websites it is after, but has contented itself with simply stealing their domains. This method indicates the temporal limitations of the group for executing its infiltration operations. In the past few months, they have carried out orders transmitted by their chief using methods which require less time. In their attack on Twitter, they hacked the computer of one of the members of this company with a Trojan horse and were able, by utilizing his email, to reset the domain of his control panel. This was similar to the attack of 1383 [2004] tried by one of the Iranian hacker groups on one of the NASA websites.5 In attacking Jaras and other websites, the Cyber Army uses the technique of DNS Cache Spoofing which changed the domain.

Footnotes

1 We have seen no reference to this. The Financial Times reported on January 13, 2010, that Iranian State Television was hacked.

2 Fars news agency claimed that Ashianeh hacked 400 Israeli sites, including Defense Minister Barak and Mossad. (January 7, 10, 2009 via World News Connection via Operation Grey Goose Phase II Report, p. 12. This claim seems exaggerated in the extreme.

3 The vagueness of the article on this point–not naming the government official, for instance–makes this story difficult for me to believe.

4 This is an interesting example of how American alarmism feeds the regime’s self-aggrandizement which in turn feeds the opposition’s alarmism. In fact, the analysis printed in Defense Tech was one man’s opinion based on sources he refused to declare. It was immediately challenged by an Iranian observer. The exchange, which is highly instructive, can be found here. The article’s author does not explain how he obtained such detailed information from such a secretive group.

5 This doesn’t seem to be taken very seriously. An article published in Wired (February 10, 2010) about probes of hack attacks on NASA does not even mention it.

Other Sources

I came upon some useful sources on Iran’s hacking community, which the above article considers a full-fledged army. Here is a very sober assessment from an Islamic website which considerably deflates this image.

This article has also been translated very ably in The Green Voice of Freedom.

This is a baffling site claiming to be of the Iranian Cyber Army, but also attacking Ahmadinejad.

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