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Taraneh Mousavi’s Fortieth

Tuesday, September 1st, 2009

Hosein Taeb’s Bouquet to the Waters
The Persians have an expression for it: Throwing a bouquet on the water. It means trying to do someone a favor, but making such a mess in the process that it completely backfires. The folk-etymology of this expression illustrates this well: A man wants to give a bouquet of flowers to the bride at a wedding. Unable to get in, he has them floated downstream. The bride, seeing the flowers, jumps into the water after them and drowns.

This is what the Islamic Republic did with its videos about the Taraneh Mousavi affair.

Click here to see the rest of the article.

The Mordad 19 (August 10) edition of the television program 20-30, famous for being a propaganda outlet for the government, showed this video. It is a common belief among the reformists that the government is deliberately planting rumors which the opposition would then pick up. The regime would then discredit the rumors and thus discredit the opposition. It is easy to see that the government was going by this playbook. By hanging the Taraneh Mousavi story around the opposition’s neck, even in cases where opposition members did <i>not</i> endorse the story, it could then discredit the opposition by discrediting the story. For those who don’t know Persian, the program begins with a survey of a number of websites which carried this story. They include the Persian-language Wikipedia, NoRuz, Facebook, the Center for the Defense of Human Rights in Iran (Kanun Defa az Hoquq Bashar dar Iran), and the Committee of Human Rights Reporters ( Gozaresh Gozaran-e Hoquq Bashar). NoRuz belongs to the Participation Front of Islamic Iran, closely associated with Sayyed Mohammad Khatami. The Wikipedia article, the television program neglected to point out, introduced the possibility that the story was a hoax. The presence of a story on Facebook proves nothing–every conceivable idea appears there. The Center for the Defense of Human Rights is a set of websites posted, apparently, in Germany, each devoted to women, children, and other issues or from various disrepair and degrees of usefulness. And, indeed, I was able to find coverage of this story as news on one of the Center’s websites, although not the one indicated in the video. More seriously, the Committee of Human Rights Reporters carried two articles supporting the story.
The video falsely accuses Mr. Katuzian, the chair of the Majlis’ Rights Committee, of endorsing the story. As the conservative site Jam-e Jam Online reported,

Katuzian … , having stated that he had not expressed himself at all on the rumors about Ms. Taraneh Mousavi’s death, said, “Showing a picture of Your Servant in a program which has absolutely no relation with him seems very odd and unusual.”
He added, “Your Servant has some time ago been associated with that current which holds that these reports and rumors are a lie, but had been advised not to say so until there be more complete information. But apparently their idea of providing more complete information is to organize a scenario to ruin and take revenge on the nation’s representatives.”
He added, “It will definitely be interesting for the people to know who has made the suggestion that Your Servant and our colleagues no declare this mater a lie.”

The Taraneh Mousavi Show
The video then shows an alleged official saying that he was able to find three Taraneh Mousavis. One was too young, one was too old, but one was… just the right age. The picture of the just the right age Taraneh does not bear a convincing resemblance to the picture of the alleged victim Taraneh, so, again, it is unclear what the producers thought they were accomplishing. Here, it should be said that it is extremely unlikely that there are only three Taraneh Mousavis in the world. Mousavi is a very common name, as is Taraneh.
Several men paid a visit to the family of this Taraneh. From within their apartment we see an older woman answering the door. Unless we believe that this footage of this woman opening the door was stock footage, the producers had placed the camera there before they paid their visit. It is hard to imagine what they meant to convey by including this footage; it ruined any sense of spontaneity in its scenario.
After the older woman, who we learn is Taraneh’s mother, lets them in, the interview with her and a younger woman, whom we are introduced to as Taraneh’s sister, begins. The picture of the girl from the government’s files is shown to the older woman, and she recognizes it as her daughter. But her daughter had been in Canada for several years and had last been in Iran no earlier than about a year and a half ago. They had in fact just spoken to her that morning and heard no such story from her. Thus, the producers want us to believe, the story of Taraneh the rape and murder victim is discredited.
Then more anomalies appear. The two women had never heard the story swirling around the internet for a month that their Taraneh Mousavi had died a horrible death at the hands of government agents. They both gave what seem to me very natural and sweet laughs at the very thought. This was the first they had heard about it. They call their Taraneh, waking her up, and tell them about the story. Taraneh’s sister can hardly contain her laughter. The scene is appropriately awkward. They have just woken up this young student across the world with a preposterous story. The line is cut. This is a deft touch. One can almost hear how annoyed their Taraneh was at being woken up to hear such nonsense from her sister. No matter. It is very hard to believe that a Taraneh Mousavi with access to an unfiltered internet connection could have remained ignorant of such a dramatic story about her alleged namesake.
There is something else odd about the speech of the two women, which otherwise struck me as unforced. They both use the expression “sar-e kar“, the sort of slang used by rowdies and hooligans, not by such refined ladies.
There are other peculiarities.
• If the story is a hoax, as the Islamic Republic’s propagandists claim, why would the hoaxsters use a real Taraneh Musavi? If I were making up a story about a drug dealer, say, would I use the name of someone I actually know?
• The Taraneh in the original story was an only child. This in itself would have gone far to discredit the story about the victim-Taraneh. But the government seemed blithely unaware of it.
• Do the parents have no photographs of their daughter whom they had sent to Canada? This would have clinched the argument and would have been very easy to provide, but the interviewer does not even make this minimal effort to prove his case.
• The government could easily have arranged an interview with the Taraneh Mousavi in Canada, but chose not to.
The regime’s story quickly unraveled. Iranians greeted the video with scorn, as can be seen in the comments which can on You Tube and Google, where the regime’s opponents quickly posted them, raising some of the same questions which appeared here. More enterprising researchers went on a hunt for other Taraneh Mousavis, of whom, you will recall, the government claimed that there were only three. One was identified, namely, an oboe player in an all-female musical ensemble. Another was identified in Gorgon, in northern Iran.
This video only made matters worse for the regime. It revived a particularly horrifying story of government cruelty which was on its way out. Imagining that they could discredit the opposition by discrediting the story, they only leant credence to a story which many Iranians treated with skepticism. The people spontaneously assumed that, since the regime was denying it, it must be true. Moreover, as luck would have it, it came at a time when stories of real rapes were emerging from the Islamic Republic’s dungeons. Amineh Amini of Feminist School posted an article saying that, whereas before, there was a lack of evidence about the case and the matter was unclear, Karroubi’s letter to Hashemi-Rafsanjani of 17 Mordad (August revealed the reality of rape in the Islamic Republic’s prisons. Moreover, the regime’s campaign of denials, she argued, had no credibility. This line of argument was accepted by the Human Rights Activists News Agency (Khabargozariye Majmueye Faalan-e Hoquq-e Bashar dar Iran), which took the position in a posting that it had originally been skeptical of the story, but felt that it prefigured what is now being learned about the use of rape as a terror tactic in the Islamic Republic’s prisons.

Enter Karroubi
On 9 Mordad, Hojjatoleslam Mehdi Karroubi sent a secret letter to Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani . According to an article published in Iran, a pro-Ahmadinejad daily, after Rafsanjani refrained from answering him for ten days, Karroubi decided to go public with the letter. (In fact, according to Mehdi Karroubi’s son, Hosein, Karroubi’s intention–as reflected in the text of the letter–was to have Rafsanjani send letter to Ayatollah Khamenei (with whom, he implausibly claims, he had a good relationship), but Rafsanjani instead sent it to Ayatollah Shahrudi, the chief of the Judiciary, who was even then on his way out of office.) This article used the line of argument pursued in the second set of frame-up tries and tried to relate his charges with those of the Peoples Mojahedin in 1981 and used the charges raised there about Mojahed infiltration into the protest movement to support his case. The attacks on Karroubi intensified in mid-August, as if by a signal. The pro-government Fars News carried more and more articles on this theme. Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative in Semnan labeled Karroubi’s letter “disgusting” and “a tasty morsel for the system’s enemies.” “Publishing this letter,” he added,” is to gamble with Iran’s honor.” The judiciary should investigate the charges and, should they be proven true, the culprit should be publicly executed, but if not, the false accuser should be tried and punished. The people responsible for this story should stop making mischief and return to the Leader. (Of course, this is precisely what Karroubi had been trying to accomplish all along…) The Friday Imam of Rasht was less charitable. “Karroubi,” he said, “has brought the country’s character under question with his lying charges and attributes to the Islamic system the crimes committed by the Americans in Abu Ghraib and Guantanemo. He must be tried for this.” He was, in addition, accused of unspecified improprieties as head of the Martyr’s Foundation.
These attacks reached a crescendo in mid-August.
Karroubi thereupon launched a blistering counter-attack, which was translated and posted by Tehran Bureau. This counter-attack happened to take place about five days after the government’s Taraneh Mousavi video was shown on television. Karroubi looked into the government’s dubious video. Elsewhere, I have translated what Karroubi had to say there about the Taraneh Mousavi affair. In this essay, he shows himself as someone who was inclined to believe the original Taraneh Mousavi story, but hazy on the details. In any case, he found himself at first convinced by the government’s video, but swung back to believing the story when a young activist dismissed the video as a fake. According to his version of the story, he had been informed about the truth of the story by an acquaintance of his who also knew Hojjatoleslam Shahmoradi, the brother-in-law of the video Taraneh Mousavi, and he went public after checking the details with Shahmoradi himself.¹ Whatever his source, he exposed the video as a transparent fraud. His most interesting revelation was that Hojjatoleslam Hosein Taeb, the newly-appointed head of the Tehran Basij, had a hand in this production.
This launched some fevered speculation that Taeb had actually been Taraneh Musavi’s rapist. One blogger, reasoned that Taeb had made the film in a panicked reaction to Karroubi’s letter to Rafsanjani. If that was his calculation, the least that can be said is that it backfired very badly; the letter only mentioned as unconfirmed reports the occurrence of rape in Iranian prisons, and it was only after the Taraneh Mousavi video that he mentioned Taeb’s role in the process, and that in a speech which lent credence to the internet rumors about the other Taraneh Mousavi. More seriously, no witnesses have placed Taeb at the scene of the crime, although there were plenty of witnesses who could have. (The author also confuses Hosein Taeb with Mehdi Taeb, as the one who called for 80 lashes for Karroubi for calling for an investigation into allegations of the rape of prisoners.) Of course, this sort of behavior on Taeb’s part cannot in general be ruled out; Taeb had practiced in the Islamic Republic’s interrogation techniques since 1981.
One measure of the new life given the Taraneh Mousavi story is that Morteza Alviri, a leading pro-Rafsanjani politician and a friend of Ayatollah Montazeri, declared that she was one of seven people who had vanished in the aftermath of the elections of whom there is neither a record of imprisonment or execution or contact with a family member. These names will be presented to a special Majlis commission.

Bring in the Clowns
With the approaching of the fortieth day after the alleged Taraneh Mousavi’s death, the sponsors of the Taraneh Mousavi hoax found a new opportunity to raise their story. Let’s visit Cherik Online (Online Guerilla) and see what they came up with.
A post dated August 3, 2009, says,

Taraneh Mousavi’s father, who was a dentist and and was laid up in bed at home because of a heart ailment and a heart operation for a month, died.
According to a report by the Online Guerilla, the date of Taraneh Mousavi’s father, according to a knowledgeable source, was the fourth or fifth of Mordad, i.e., a week ago.
At present, the only person remaining in Taraneh’s family is her mother, a relatively tall and slightly chubby woman with short white hair, white skin, and a growth like a double chin resulting from goiters on the right side of her neck.

I was going to comment on this story, but the blog’s readers beat me to the punch.

Anonymous, August 3, 2009:
“You always have good news on your blog, but this time, no matter how much I thought about it, I could not figure out why you are presenting Taraneh Mousavi’s visible personal characteristics, and in such detail???!!!!!”

Anonymous, August 11, 2009:
Why have you shown no response to the 20:30 show which denied the report about Taraneh Mousavi? If you have firm sources of information on this, you really should be able to present more important sources for Taraneh Mousavi to improve your blog’s credibility.

Anonymous, August 11, 2009:
Dear Guerilla, this report about Taraneh Mousavi stank from the start. In my opinion, it is absolutely unimportant if this case is true or not, since they have done thousands of other filthy deeds which cause this story (whether it is true or false) to appear true. In any case, most places refer to you as the prime source of this report. I, too, as I recall, saw this news for the first time on Balatarin. I don’t know if this is true or false, but if you can indirectly confirm the report you have given, it would increase your blog’s credibility among the people.

A post dated August 17, 2009 announces Online Guerilla’s calculation of Taraneh Mousavi’s Fortieth. The fortieth day of a person’s death is an important one in Shiite Islam, observed with great solemnity. Here is the post:

The first of Shahrivar marks the fortieth day after Taraneh Mousavi’s death. News of her arrest at the meeting at Qoba Mosque was announced by her family on 24 Tir.
According to Cherik Online’s report, Taraneh Mousavi disappeared for eighteen days after her arrest and then her family was faced with her burnt body. On 24 Tir, her family reported the discovery of her body around Qazvin, but the exact date of her death was not specified. Therefore, the date of her death has been calculated from 24 Tir. By this calculation, the fortieth day after her death is on Shahrivar 1.
The Green Movement has held meetings for the passing of many of its martyrs. If there is any inclination towards holding a meeting for the fortieth day after Taraneh Mousavi’s passing and this meeting is officially announced by the media controlled by the Greens, Online Guerilla will publish Taraneh Mousavi’s address.

The place of Mousavi’s interment has been announced as the village Vazivar, near Chamestan in Mazandaran.

It is astonishing that after all this time of honoring the Mousavi family’s privacy and keeping its whereabouts a secret, the Online Guerilla is taking it upon himself to unilaterally publish this address to lure the Green Movement into recognizing a story it has been keeping at arm’s length.
No stories have since appeared on Online Guerilla, although it had published five stories the first half of August.

I have mentioned the hoax perpetrated by Online Guerilla about the Revolutionary Guard commander who refused to order his men into action. When this was exposed by said commander, the Online Guerilla blamed the Islamic Republic for deceiving him. If and when the truth comes out about who started the Taraneh Mousavi hoax and why, we can look forward to a similar act of cowardice and irresponsibility from this Online Che Guevara!

Then there is Online Guerilla’s comrade website, Iranian Leftists, run by Omid Habibinia out of Switzerland. He has also been depressed and frustrated about the skepticism the hoax he helped launch has received in the independent Iranian blogosphere. Radio Zamaneh “has taken its place next to the [Iranian] judiciary, police, and Voice and Vision” in denying the existence of Taraneh Mousavi.” This should cheer the Islamic Republic’s conspiracy mongers, who consider Radio Zamaneh to be part of the international media assault on the Ahmadinejad government. Links to the “interview” with an alleged friend of Taraneh Mousavi were also removed from many reformist websites. Here, it must be said that this interview was even more ridiculous than the Taraneh Mousavi Show orchestrated by the Islamic Republic’s security forces. Let the reader decide.

But Iranian Leftists consoles himself that Taraneh Mousavi’s case was introduced into the American Congress. Of course, he does not report that this was done by a right-wing congressman to suit his own political agenda. Any port in a storm…

Notes:
1 This mysterious source who had tipped Karroubi off could not have been Taeb, who was a mortal enemy of Karroubi’s and only appears on his radar screen late in the day. It is conceivable that this mysterious character is a pious fiction to shield Karroubi from Shahmoradi’s charges of oath-breaking, but this would leave him open to an a ngry rejoinder by Shahmoradi.

Tags: Abu Ghraib, Ali Khamenehi, Ali Khamenei, Ayatollah Montazeri, Ayatollah Shahrudi, Cherikonline, Guantanemo, Iranian-e Chap, Mehdi Karroubi, Mehdi Karubi, Mir Hosein Mousavi, Mir Hosein Musavi, Mojahedin, Omid Habibinia, Radio Zamaneh, Revolutionary Guards, Taeb, Taraneh Mousavi, Taraneh Musavi, Tehran Bureau, Voice and Vision, Zeerzamin
Posted in Misinformation, Taraneh Mousavi | 6 Comments »

The Complete Text of the Indictment of the Second Group of Accused in the Project for a Velvet Coup

Tuesday, August 18th, 2009

According to an article by Fereshteh Qazi published in the 18 Mordad 1388 [August 9, 2009] Ruz , the following were accused in an indictment issued on 17 Mordad 1388 [August 8, 2009] by Judge Abdol-Qasem Salavati, head of Section 15 of the Islamic Revolutionary Court:

Clotilde Reiss, the French citizen whose case is well known in the West, and Nazak Afshar, a staff member of the cultural section of the French Embassy, along with Hosein Rasam, a senior analyst of the political section of the British Embassy. In addition, “political and journalistic activists” Dr. Ahmad Zeidabadi, Dr. Ali Tajernia, Hedayat Aqayi, Shahab od-Din Tabatabai (a prominent leader of the Islamic Iran Participation Front leader), and Mohammad Javad Emam were present for this indictment. Ahmad Zeidabadi had been the leader of the students’ section of the Strengthening Unity Circles’s wife wrote an open letter in which she declares that her husband had been driven to the point of insanity by his mistreatment. in prison. He had been arrested on 31 Khordad and dispatched to an unknown location and held in an isolation cell, according to this letter.⁰

Click here to see the rest of the article.

According to the Reporter for Fars News Agency, the following is the complete text of the accused in the velvet coup:

“Lord, For that which you have favored me, I will never aid the criminals.” (Koran, al-Qasas: 17)
Honorable president of the 15th branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Court of Tehran.
As you have been apprised, after the maximal presence of the God-loving and proud people of Islamic Iran in the tenth presidential elections and their answering the appeal of the Supreme Leader (May his lengthy shadow lengthen!) in renewing the covenant with the aspirations of the late Imam (May God have mercy on him!) in the thirtieth year since the Islamic Revolution’s victory, which has confirmed in the world a golden page in religious democracy and an unprecedented record of the presence of the people, a refractory current is trying to sow sedition and blacken this great source of pride and undo society’s order and security and upset public opinion and utilitize opposition media and opportunist individuals and have relationships with foreigners and use the capacities of counter-revolutionary groups which have for years sought an opportunity to deal a blow to our Islamic country’s security and, through planning a conspiracy and a deceptive scenario, claim fraud and falsification in the elections to try to turn one of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s political system’s greatest sources of political pride into a security battle and a propaganda weapon for a coup against the system.
During yesterday’s session, in the first introduction to the Tehran court’s charges, the indications that these riots had been planned in advance and the documents proving the recent organized and planned crimes were presented to the court. During this session, the planning, including planning by foreign countries opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran, with the intention of collapsing [the system] and staging a soft coup in Iran and intervening in the post-presidential election events [and] operations by the counter-revolutionary and terrorist grouplets and their role in the events after the elections and the recent riots will be presented.

A) Planning by foreign countries opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran with the intention of staging a soft coup in Iran and their intervention in the events after the elections to the presidency.

The victory of the Islamic revolution and the threat to foreign imperialist interests domestically and in the strategic region of the Persian Gulf has resulted in the rise of the West’s hostility against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and for just this reason and in various periods, the execution of numerous political and intelligence plots to confront the [Islamic Republican] system were put on their agendas.
On the other hand, the difficulties of the West, led by America, in quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Zionist regime’s defeat in the 33 day war with Hezbollah and the 22 day war in Gaza reduced the likelihood and ability of using military force against the Islamic Republic of Iran and for this very reason put the creation of a structural change in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s sacred system through new intelligence and secret and soft measures on the West’s agenda. Along these lines, the issue of cyberspace, satellite media, etc. were used by foreigners as effective and new tools to change opinions and, according to the West’s culture of espionage, changing opinions will in turn lay the basis for changing behavior and, ultimately, changing the country’s structure.
Along these lines, the new policies of the West, particularly the United States and Britain, to confront the Islamic Republic of Iran are based on three principles:

Democratization (democracy for Western aims and interests);
Keeping the [Islamic Republican] system preoccupied domestically by creating domestic insecurity and intensifying conflicts;
Reining in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s regional power;

It has been confirmed that in order to achieve these goals, utilizing the media, public diplomacy, create populist [mardomnahad] organizations and networks and oppositional organizations with the goal of inciting civil disobedience and rolling out a project of non-violent struggle will play the most important roles and enormous budgets and new means of communication have been set aside for this. On the other hand, Western spy agencies were not negligent in taking advantage of all domestic opportunities and resources afforded by the opposition, which is considered to be their operational and executive arms, and the above-mentioned groups, including the illegal group the Freedom Movement, are playing the role of perpetuating insecurity and embroiling the system in strife and playing the role of pawns and the enemy’s fifth column.
Along the same lines, the Hypocrite grouplet [the Organization of People’s Mojahedin of Iran--OPMI] and the separatist and ethnic currents, led and supported by foreigners, create political and ethnic differences and an atmosphere of crisis, are hastening to implement anti-security programs during the days of the presidential elections. An example of their aims and efforts can be considered the effort to assassinate a candidate for the presidency and blame it on the system in order to create an accusation against the system’s authorities, spread differences, and create doubt in various social layers.
Methods to destroy the Islamic Republic:
In order to advance these policies, the enemies of the system (of the sacred Islamic Republic of Iran—comment in the original) put the planning, sketching, and execution axes of the methods of destroying the Islamic Republic of Iran’s in the hands of spy agencies and dependent institutions, some of which are:

Propaganda about and spreading word of the necessity for political regime change;
International support from labor unions, craftsmen, groups which so-called defended human rights and civil organizations which opposed the Islamic Republic;
Actions for economic boycotts against the Islamic Republic of Iran;
Secret financial support to oppositional forces in the system;
Identifying, attracting, and strengthening effective centers and individuals and layers in society such as women, youth, NGOs, etc., to achieve specific ends;

Noting the time table on the country’s calendar for holding the 2009 presidential elections, the program for executing the above ends [sic] through foreigners via opportunists among the existing liberals for staging a soft coup in the Islamic Republic of Iran under the cover of public diplomacy and covert action entered the stage of execution.
Soft coup and covert action:
A soft coup which is disguised and is referred to as public diplomacy in order to make it appear normal in public opinion has the following special qualities:
From the point of view of a Western intelligence institution:
“Public diplomacy pursues the following goal: to protect our national security and interests in other country’s through knowledge, awareness, and influencing the people of other countries and through a dialogue between our citizens and their foundations and colleagues abroad.”
A soft coup from the Western perspective is the same as imposing the values and frameworks of thought which govern Western societies on other societies that they might thereby automatically make the system of that country a target of influence and align it with the ruling system’s policies.
The goal of the West’s public diplomacy is “nations” and its course and ultimate aim is to exert influence with the intent of easing policies conducive to covert operations and overthrow. Along these lines, covert actions in the context of public diplomacy require the employment of the most intricate aggressive psychological operational techniques.

Getting the government to take positions which they want by exerting popular pressure;
Creating an atmosphere of distrust concerning the system’s officials and disrupting the means of decision-making;
Distracting society’s public opinion from the system’s interests and principles and spreading means the means it has in mind in society by sowing doubts in the system’s values;
Creating differences in various trends of society and dissension and division between the people and the government by accusing the system’s leaders and officials of lying;
[Creating] dissent in intellectual, ethnic, religious, etc. groups with the aim of disrupting national unity;

In expressing the importance of this part of the secret measures, a Western countries’ foreign minister declared, “At the present time, our efforts in the field of public diplomacy are much more important than other measures, so that these efforts are inseparable from our foreign policy faced with oppositional governments.”
The West’s national security strategy after the collapse of the former Soviet Union has been planned and rebuilt to conform with international developments. It has determined its duties for those countries’ various security establishments for the effective execution of this strategy and has compiled security-leadership reports on this matter.
A point worth noting in the agendas of these reports is the orientation of their measures towards covert action and their negative view of military war and their proposing “a soft war” or “internal collapse” in the case of the Islamic Republic.
The policies planned against Iran speak to the West’s strategy against the Islamic Republic and within the framework of public diplomacy and the importance of utilizing it is to such an extent that these reports might be named the West’s Covert Action Manifesto against the Islamic Republic.
One of the West’s senior security officials declared, in expressing the importance of employing strategies known as public diplomacy against Iran, “Iran, due to the vastness of its territory, the quality of its population, the character of its human resources, its military means, its abundant natural resources, and its distinguished geographical position in the Middle East and the region’s heartland has become an unparalleled power which can no longer be overthrown by military attack.”
The important axes of the reports, which emphasize the necessity for using public diplomacy tactics, speak of a program which the West’s politicians have in mind as public diplomacy against the Islamic Republic:

Exploiting internal differences within Iran;
Utilizing a soft coup instead of military measures;
Inciting civil disobedience in university organizations and NGOs and trade organizations as important tools to exert pressure on Iran;
The need to emphasize the presence of international supervision over the elections;
Demagogic support for human rights and democracy in Iran;
Setting in motion and strengthening numerous radio and television networks with the intent of denigrating and deceiving the people;
Supporting the domestic opposition;
Easing the activating of NGOs aligned with the West;
Easing the granting of visas for people who are groomed by the West and support its goals;
Inviting young Iranian activists with the intention of participating in seminars outside the country to attract and tendentiously educate them as they did in countries like Serbia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Chile, the Ukraine, etc.;

On the other hand, part of its security doctrines includes:
“We will perhaps not be faced with a challenge from any country more serious than from Iran. We have other concerns regarding Iran which are as important as the nuclear issue. Our concerns will ultimately be solved when the Iranian government makes the leadership decision to change is policies and open its political system and give its people freedom. This is our ultimate aim. Our policy is to spread interaction with the people of Iran. In order to do away with oppression and increase democracy, we will use all the political, economic, diplomatic, and other tools at our disposal, including

Exposing cases of violations of human rights;
Supporting reformists through holding meetings in our State Government and embassies;
Assigning a budge to give financial support to activities favored by the West in Iran;
Imposing boycotts with the aim of creating divisions between the people and the government;

On the basis of the existing documentation, the project of a soft coup or, as they call it, public diplomacy, is on the agenda of Western politicians in various ways, depending on the internal, regional, and international conditions of the Islamic Republic, the most important of which are:

Helping and training NGOs and publishing Persian-language pamphlets on democratic values and civil activities towards this end;
Training reporters to form news source networks towards the end of gathering information and analysis;
Training and organizing human rights activists in Iran to present an unfavorable view of it;
Creating websites and training for holding elections and presenting full information’s on the 2009 electoral candidates;
Dispatching students, artists, and professions and training them to form a cadre for sensitive key and appropriate posts in the future;

Following the founding of an Iranian Affairs Office in Dubai (set up in the American consulate) by the American State Department which was copied from the base in Riga, Lithuania, during the Cold War era with the aim of collapsing the former Soviet Union, this office had on its agenda activities concerning attracting Iranian leaders and influencing their ideas and impressions with the intention of encouraging them to act against the Islamic Republic of Iran’s national interests. Along these lines, the spokesman for the then-Secretary of State declared,
“The American government will collaborate with NGOs and Iranian media through its embassies in the countries along the Persian Gulf and other countries neighboring Iran. We will increase travel agencies between Iran and America and spend five million dollars for visits of professors and teachers and other professionals from America.”
On this very basis, the Iranian Affairs Office in Dubai, in the course of the past two years, on the excuse of holding training sessions and sending numerous groups from various layers to America, is hurrying to prepare the grounds needed to establish relations with various social layers and society’s leaders and the invitees travel to America without enduring the usual stages of obtaining a visa with the aid of the official of the Office of Iranian Affairs in the American consulate in Dubai (Messrs. Jillian [?] Barns [?], Ramin Asgard [?], Timothy Richardson) to deliberately influence them and, after returning, as someone in charge of forming new groups and send them to America.
The defeat of America’s plans against Iran which occurred with the arrest of some of their domestic agents [anything specific?], convinced the Americans to execute a new plan and idea, titled Project Exchange.¹ In its framework, the sending of individuals and groups to America was initiated through the expenditure of vast sums through bases they had created against Iran (in Dubai, Istanbul, Baku, London, and Frankfurt).
The stages of America’s measures within the framework of American public diplomacy in Iran are composed of:

1) Executing the Soros Foundation’s regional initiative.
2) Project Exchange.
3) Bilateral exchange.
In this project, the travel of individuals and leaders from various layers of society in groups of fifteen to various states in America were planned. All the stages of obtaining visas, their expenses (airfare, hotels, visits, and purchases, the program for their presence in America, etc.) was executed under the leadership and management and planning of this country’s State Department and under the cover of foundations such as the Meridian, Peace [?], Aspen, etc. (Let it be noted that this project remained unsuccessful due to the blow which the Ministry of Intelligence inflicted on its agents in 2008. [?])
Among the desirable characteristics indicated for these individuals to be considered was their youth, certainty that they would return to Iran, higher education, relations with government institutions and centers, a lack of a bad political record, etc.
America’s political and intelligence Project Exchange were:

The establishment of relations with different groups of society and the creation of effective relationships with specialists;
A change of perspective and point of view of the participants towards America;
A change of perspective in Iranian society with the goal of the necessity of the Iranian government’s establishing relations with America through pressure from below;
Obtaining analyses and viewpoints of the participants in Project Exchange;
Influence in social layers and planning towards reviving America’s lost interests in Iran;
Pressure on the government to change its behavior;
Weakening the government’s bases and weakening and ultimately collapsing the system;
Making America out to be Iran’s only savior;
Intensifying the division between the nation and the government;
Disturbing the country’s decision-making system;
Creating currents and exerting influence in the guise of protest meetings and assemblies;
[Accusing S]ociety’s elite [of] abuse of security;
Inciting ethnic movements;
[Effecting] desired legal changes towards a Western legal system;
Creating changes in the country’s electoral system on the excuse of the need for international oversight over the electoral arena.

In comparing the conditions governing Iran with those of countries like the Ukraine or Georgia, the Western countries have found elections to be an appropriate venue for advancing their corrupt ends and creating the changes they have in mind, and went to implement their programs by utilizing human potential without direct foreign intervention and pressure from outside and through non-violent methods of struggle and transforming social demands to political ones and [utilizing] cyberspace and internet sites as the most important tools and apparently legal components.
On the basis of results obtained from investigations made and the confessions of the accused, the most important measures of the foreigners, and above all the Americans and the British, towards activity against the Islamic Republic of Iran in this arena was based on the following techniques:

Holding terms of education outside the country;
Activating internet sites and networks with the goal of spreading intelligence [sic] and molding opinion based on approved-of goals and programs. (Along these lines, the American State Department has entered chatrooms and weblogs by founding the Digital Outreach Team and has directly established relations with the people and has taken responsibility for a form of systematizing relations between the peole of Iran and the American government. Along these lines, American political circles have pursued a policy of creating division between the government and the people of Iran and creating similar tactics through relations with Iranian youth.);²
Activating satellite channels (particularly in Persian);
Choosing groups from various social layers (legal, medical, artistic, student, professors, clergy, etc.) to sent to America and participate in programs of visits and training;
Planning to change opinion and behavior with the aim of effecting a change in the sacred structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
Laying the basis for increasing [feelings of] insecurity about the future and executive programs in the country and strengthening tendencies perspectives towards America;
Activating European intelligence and research foundations for the establishment of connections with people they have in mind and creating relations with domestic centers under cover of institution-building;
Preparing educational stipends for people they have in mind and returning them after making them intellectually receptive;
Instrumentalizing English under the excuse of identifying and recruiting members of the elite and setting in motion NGOs and sending desired people to enter the country;
Holding journalistic training sessions in Holland and England;
Utilizing local staff towards establishing unofficial relations;
[Holding i]ntelligence exchanges and cooperation with other spy agencies with the aim of utilizing their intelligence and resources;
Instigating and guiding people with the intent of spreading the scope of protests;

Foreign intelligence operations in the tenth presidential elections:

Reviewing and studying the potential in the existing atmosphere in the country with the aim of creating disturbances in relations between the people and the elite with the Supreme Leader and the Velayat-e Faqih;
Efforts towards diminishing popular support for the sacred system of the Islamic Republic of Iran (domestically or abroad) and defeating the Islamic Republic of Iran’s perspective with the aim of preventing Iran from becoming a successful model for other countries of the world;
Utilizing human potential with the intent of gaining goals they have in mind, such as creating distrust and fanning the flames of popular protest, strengthening ethnic currents and the domestic opposition, implementing democratizing projects in Iran with the aim of changing opinions, behavior, and, ultimately, the system’s structure;
Efforts towards exacerbating the divide between the people and the government, exploiting internal differences and existing capacity in this field, particularly in circles related to parties, political currents and officials, and ethnic and religious differences;
Encouraging some Iranians living abroad to engage in activity against the Islamic Republic of Iran and utilize propaganda from societies and their protests;
Organizing, leading, and providing material, political and media support for terrorist groups and cooperation between the domestic and foreign opposition and discontented social groups;
Preparing the basis for the implementation of a soft coup project and the formation of educational terms in various countries (such as the Emirates and Holland) under cover of themes like human rights and non-violent struggle;
Creating and providing material and moral support to NGOs with the intent to create currents in various social layers and to take advantage of their potential and resources according to the dictates of the circumstances;
Activating projects to create domestic crisis (particularly in social circles) and pursuing plans of pressure from without and change from within;
Focusing on psychological operations, spreading rumors, creating currents and propaganda about the Islamic system’s incompetence through Persian internet sites, satellite channels, particularly the Voice of America and the BBC Persian service and other [sic] fugitive, counter-revolutionary news channels, the monarchists, the Hypocrites [OPMI], and other means of networking;
Leading NGOs and currents opposing the system with the perspective of having supervision led by the Americans over the electoral process;
Emphasizing the emergence of fraud and uncertainty concerning the soundness of Iran’s electoral process (about ten days before the votes were counted) and efforts towards raising this topic through sites related to the State Department. (Among the issues are: cutting off the sending of ballots, reducing internet speed, the emergence of difficulties regarding the presence of candidates’ supervisors in vote-counting posts, etc.). It is necessary to explain that the official of Mr. Musavi’s office’s Committee for the Preservation of Votes said that this was an indication that the elections were fraudulent while discussing this matter a week before the elections. (15/3/88 = June 5, 2009);
Provocations and preparing the grounds for domestic violent movements and civil disobedience and setting the stage for the appearance of street rioting and creating insecurity and destruction and chaos;
Efforts towards creating accusations and psychological warfare against the Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly in the matter of violating human rights, with the aim of escalating the Islamic Republic of Iran’s isolation in the international arena;

Some of the measures of the Western countries and their spy agencies which are appropriate to the above-mentioned goals and which were implemented by embassies and dependent media before the elections are as follows:

The British embassy’s effort to get closer to political parties in Iran, the first contact of which occurred in Azar 1387 [November-December 2008] with one of the well-known figures and it was announced to them that the embassy intends to establish relations with some political parties of Iran and it was announced right there that we will search for these parties after you. (This effort was faced with defeat at that very stage through intelligence’s readiness.);
Towards the end of 1387[the end of the winter of 2008-2009], an 18-point agenda on the elections in Iran was issued by the British government which, while apportioning the work on the tenth presidential elections, concerned the role of various circles of the system they were interested in and issued an agenda of news and intelligence-gathering;
Numerous travels by British diplomats to various cities of Iran, particularly Qom, establishing contacts with some of the candidates’ electoral offices in the provinces, the active presence of British diplomats on election day in various centers, etc, which speaks of general active efforts of the embassies on the elections;
A widespread use of local staff by the British embassy in intelligence gathering on the city level and political activists and social conditions. Along these lines, the use of local staff with higher education (doctorates) and high political perspective and their use in establishing relations with elements who have access to intelligence and obtaining their specialized analyses along with their valuable intelligence during the elections. Some of the embassy’s efforts were:
Widespread British intelligence activity in gathering intelligence on disturbances and riots after the elections in such a way that they have practically constantly assigned their local staff to be present in conflicts and pursue gathering [intelligence] while instructing their local staff to be in contact with political parties and gather and report their analyses and perspectives;
Relatively focused activity by the BBC Persian service on electoral affairs in Iran in the period leading up to the elections insinuating that they were not enthusiastic, they were phony, a destructive focus on the government’s foreign policy to destroy the government’s image, etc.;
Announcing that British diplomats expect unanticipated and bloody events;
Relations of the Cultural-Educational Council [British Council] (BC) with the social framework with the intention of preparing relationships by granting scholarships, holding language training, etc. By these means, the British tried to tour the Iranian government and, in addition to identifying and pointing out individuals they had in mind, put the minimum funds at the disposal of influential people at critical conditions; [?]
Identifying knowledgeable people by holding English classes (ILETS [International English Language Testing System]). Using this method, the British embassy would try to identify influential people and prepare the way to exploiting them under critical conditions;
Creating a VIP section in the visa division with the intent to exploit people who had access in various circles of the country and getting close to them on the excuse of holding private interviews;
The embassy’s diplomatic measures for establishing relations with ethnic and cultural leaders with the intent of identifying and attracting them to further desired goals;
The presence of embassy diplomats in various regions of the country under the cover of students of the Persian language and establishing relations with the people of the region;
Laying the basis for attracting political-cultural individuals in England to further desired interests. (Ataollah Mohajerani);
Connections of British intelligence-research institutions with intelligence-research institutions within Iran in order to exert influence (Chatham House and IISS);
Activating England as America and Israel’s intelligence arm in order to compensate for a lack of American and Israeli presence in Iran;
Establishing relations with some leaders, parties, and political figures with the intent of gathering intelligence and preparing them to cooperate with the [intelligence] service of that country;
Contacting proprietors of media and press with the intent of having an impact on society;
Towards the end of Farvardin[the beginning of April] , a term of training was held in Germany in the presence of five people from the center of representatives on the subject of the rights of citizens and cybercrime and the above-mentioned individuals began to form working groups to watch out for electoral violations upon their return;
Planning to send groups of reporters to America to prepare the necessary training to have the supervision of the elections to the presidency under American leadership;
Statements of some officials of foreign representatives in Iran based on the expectation of unanticipated events in Iran after the presidential elections;
The publication of false news on the portable telephone wiretapping system in Iran and its strength. On this issue, the Nokia Sims, which has sold the wiretapping system to Iran, made an operation to prepare false information about Iran’s wiretapping system’s capacity;

The foreigners’ measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran after the glorious 22 Khordad [June 12] elections were:

To weaken the velayat-e faqih’s status. This is part of the foreigners’ priority deeds and goals against the Islamic Republic of Iran and a lack of attention by some political currents to the commands and guidance of the Supreme Leader (particularly after the historical sermons of the Friday prayers of 29/3/88 [June 19, 2009]) presented an appropriate opportunity for the foreigners to fan the flames of this issue. Along these lines, the disgraceful efforts based on insinuating a division between the views of the Supreme Leader and that of His Eminence the Imam (Peace be upon him!) were made by the enemies’ propaganda aparatus;
Creating division in the united ranks of the nation and weakening popular support for the Islamic Revolution’s principles and goals;
Spreading an atmosphere of difference between political currents, parties, and individuals;
Dragging the Islamic Republic of Iran’s system’s legitimacy into conflict and posing claims on the matter of the system and its officer’s enjoyment of popular support;
Efforts towards confirming the system’s ineffectualness in creating democracy, holding sound elections, confronting the latest crisis, and observing human rights;
Emphasizing the need for the presence of foreigners and elector observers in the Islamic Republic of Iran for guaranteeing the soundness of the elections held. (This issue was seriously on the agenda of countries such as America and Britain and dependent grouplets like the Freedom Movement.);

Some of the interventionist declarations of American political and intelligence positions after the elections were:

The former head of the CIA’s saying that goons and thugs and economic and social difficulties had the desired potential to create domestic crisis;
Emphasizing the need to invalidate the elections on the excuse of “the need to pay attention to the protesters’ demands and observe the principles and requirements of democracy in elections;”
Laying out the line for making a pattern of the role of youth in the course of the Islamic Revolution’s victory of 1979 and reconstituting the conditions for utilizing this potential to confront the system;
Sending and activating its agents under the excuse of honorary and freelance reporters after the return of foreign reporters;
Training in civil disobedience through internet sites (like the site Gozar, http://www.gozaar.org/ tied to Freedom House http://www.freedomhouse.org/ http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Herman%20/Manufac_Consent_Prop_Model.html and the CIA);
Support of some American and European officials to the street fighting;
Issuing a statement by the American Congress in support of the rioters and condemning the system;
Activating media and internet networks and creating cyberspace to spread desirable stories, provoking the people to be present in illegal meetings and riots and spreading forged and false stories on the number of killed;
Insisting on calling the rioters protesters and setting them up against the system;
The relationship of one of the active elements of Staff 88 (the accused Reza Rafi’i) with the special Office of Iranian Affairs in Dubai and Ms. Jilian Barnes as an American intelligence officer; the sending of news and reports related to the riots through internet sites and cooperation with the intelligence services of one of the region’s Arab countries. This person, while establishing relations with American media foundations, hurried to obtain analyses relevant to the activities of foreigners and opposing the principles of the revolution from one of the country’s former figurers and information about the impact of the boycott as problems relating to the running of the elections in the hands of Ms. Nazi Beglari of VOA [Voice of America]; [?]
After limitations on satellite networks, the stream of intelligence moved towards the internet and in order to easy the use of internet subjects, they placed advanced software for translating English to Persian and vice versa into the hands of Iranian operators for public use in such a way that by using this software, they could translate matter on English sits to Persia and study them. These measures were meant to make a maximum of information in English (particularly the BBC) related to the crisis available to Iranian operators, although they have serious weaknesses;
Offering the most advanced software resources so that one can view a film through [يك رايانه] with a telephone line and a modem and a slow internet connection so that those who are connected can themselves, with a minimum of resources, can use the films they have in mind about the riots;
Hacking sites belonging to both currents in the country and, similarly, sites related to the system’s officials, sites belonging to some candidates, etc., through foreigners in order to exacerbate the domestic atmosphere of pessimism. Along these lines, in some instances, there were efforts to hack through domestic internet [?] (Shatel Company, etc.) so that foreign agents’ hands will not appear and it will be completely converted to a domestic conflict;
Activating the American company Facebook to ease relations between operators in Iran and those of other countries concerning Iran. This company has presented its Persian version based on the fact that many of the people of the world use Facebook to exchange information about the fate of the elections in Iran, so the Persian-speakers can use it in their mother tongue;
During the period of disturbances, some sites connected with the foreign issued telephone numbers, names of operators, and passwords for free for their operators so that if internet service is completely shut down in Iran, those who were connected and individuals could the internet via dial up;
Regarding the rise of information for training, information related to violent and peaceful struggles, there has been a massive amount of training in Persian posted on the internet during the days of disturbances. Along these lines, there are two hands [دو دسته] of subjects available:
1. Subjects related to teaching violent means of protest—constructing remote control bombs and time bombs and ways to struggle with anti-riot forces, ways to beat the police, preparing tear gas at home, gathering and publishing complete information about members of the basij;
2. Subjects relating to teaching means of peaceful protest such as preparing CDs or Blue Tooth of desired material, spreading green over government pictures and propaganda, turning on car lights and in the early hours of dusk as a sign of protest, advise about writing slogans on roofs;
3. The presence of a German lawyer related to the Lawyer’s Center in Iran and his taking residence in a hotel in located in a center of disturbances;
4. The direct presence of some diplomats in illegal street meetings (such as some of the ambassadors of European countries and Britain) gathering intelligence through some of those connected with the ambassadors present in illegal gatherings as well as the presence of disguised aides to the French ambassador in electoral centers, as documented in existing files;
5. Financial cooperation and support to the rioters and counter-revolutionary grouplets by some European countries such as Britain and granting visa and asylum to rioting elements;
6. The use of local employees through some European embassies for gathering intelligence and desired information;
7. Activating two local employees to gather signatures with the aim for the UN General Secretary’s visiting Iran;
8. Efforts to launch a strike in Iran;
9. Presenting to local employees in Germany specialized training for gathering news;
10. Gathering intelligence in the form of a channel through the accused Ms. Clotilde Reiss (a French citizen) of riots and expressing to one of the orators the need for a strike, according to her confession of 10/4/88 [July 1, 2009];
11. Supporting protest meetings outside the country by some European countries;
12. European threats to recall their ambassadors to exert pressure on the country and public opinion;
13. Threaten to step up the boycott of the Islamic Republic;
14. Placing limitations on issuing visas for the Islamic Republic of Iran’s statesmen;
15. During the time of disturbances, the Zionist regime’s intelligence services summoned its sources and announced that it intended to hold talks with them about the elections. In addition to these matters, during the disturbances, two influential individuals tied to Israel’s intelligence services intervened at the scene of a clash and participated in setting buses on fire. To influential individuals were present at the scenes of the disturbances every night of the disturbances until the last hours of the night, gathering intelligence;
16. The foreigners political measures, particularly those of Britain, America, and some European countries completely oriented to intensifying the riots and giving them prominence and creating home in the continuing the riots and protests and speeding them;

Along these lines, notable measures which are unacceptable from a diplomatic perspective, the main ones being

Public support to rioters with announcements that the doors of the European embassies of some of the governments were open to agents of the rioters;
Issuing statements and organizing demonstrations by some European political parties and efforts towards uniting the political demonstrations against the Islamic Republic among the European countries;

The role of British political, intelligence, and media institutions in the events which occurred after the tenth presidential elections:
Following the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the British who from the perspective of influence in the government and precise knowledge of the structure and political behavior of the new statesmen suffered a blow and a palpable poverty in intelligence, made widespread efforts for the past thirty years to increase their information. They, who considered themselves the great inheritors of Britania’s empire, after the decline of the past golden age, now consider themselves a superpower, indeed, a central power in world politic with a new role which, considering the British Foreign Ministry’s new events and greater attention to the Middle East in general and Iran in particular and took broad measures in espionage and lording it over the socio-political situation and spread its sphere of influence.
Although the bases for relations between these two countries were not deeply evolve compared to before the revolution, the English still tried to maintain their presence and influence in various pillars and levels in the Islamic Republic of Iran as an important and influential country in the Middle East and pursue its political, cultural, and economic interests.
Britain so-called officially and superficially rejected any policy of hard regime change, but on the other hand, in hidden zones it tried to make the appropriate preparations to utilize a strategy of a soft coup by establishing relations with various groups in society. Indubitably, the elections in Iran were one of the most important situations of which the British knew the details so that, given the exigencies of the situation, it might put into action the necessary plans to intervene and take advantage of the weak points and internal wounds towards the end of changing opinions and behavior for its various policies.
Britania’s Cultural-Educational Council [British Council], which operates as the British embassy in Iran’s cultural section has a record of having a presence in the country from the time before the Islamic Revolution (under the title of the Iran-British Society), and in the new period, from 2000-2001 resumed work under the name of the English Cultural and Educational Council. The British Cultural Council was an independent organization and has branches in over a hundred countries and its center is in London. But in Iran, it is considered the cultural branch of the British embassy. Among the BC’s numerous activities one can point to its holding general and specialized training in the English language, cooperative education, granting scholarships in various fields of higher [?] education, as well as leaders, researchers, professors in universities and centers of higher education, officials, employees in various institutions, journalists, and the like. On the other hand, the leadership of scholarly educational, research, and artistic projects with the participation of Iranian and British centers, joint university projects, and numerous other such were within the sphere of this center.
Although these activities seemed in and of themselves ordinary matters, it is important to note that this British center, under cover of these projects, pursued other goals, such as identifying and attracting scientific and university leaders, plans and projects of the country’s centers of higher education and research, gathering intelligence in various fields under the guise of opinion polling of present sources, holding public and private consultation meetings for individuals who intend to study or travel abroad, and numerous other matters.
This council, in cooperation and coordination with the British embassy in Tehran, under the pretext of the British Foreign Office’s Chewning Scholarships, sends a number of the best students and graduates of Iran’s universities to continue their studies in graduate fields of study or allow then opportunities to do research and complete projects of self-discovery, and by holding interviews about sending them, disincline some of them to return to Iran after they complete their term of study.
As for other forms of scholarship grants of the BC, one can mention short-term scholarships and aid funds specifically for studies for some of the university professors and members of various universities in Iran. They enjoy help from its central office in London for trips to Britain.
BC makes great efforts to have those who are sent to Britain on various excuses, to maintain their connects after they return to Iran and use them in various ways to secure British interests. In other words, such individuals they make them the BC’s connections in various internal organizations. They even invite them with various excuses to participate in the British embassy’s and BC’s ceremonies and occasions so that in the course of such ceremonies, senior diplomats assigned to British intelligence activities could obtain full intelligence about these individuals, such as their jobs and positions in the government’s centers.
In any case, the basis of British work in general and BC in particular is to identify and attract individuals in various institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran so that they could go into action by utilizing them for their intelligence aims in Iran.
It is by holding courses through the support of the British Consulate and the cooperation of British and Iranian circles within Iran that they put into operation the final stages of their projects for which they paid all these expenses (travel, residency, study, etc.). One important point is that some of these projects because of the importance they assign them among the national projects and the research connected with some of them through their cooperation with BC or other British centers prepares the way for them to be exploited by the foreigners.
With the approach of the time for the elections and the serious presence of the candidates in the country’s political campaigning field, the embassy’s political department went into action in the earnest presence and organized disguise which the local and powerful employees of this section formed, from the end of Farvardin 1388 [March-April 2009] with organization and a division of duties, for the sake of gathering intelligence and news on matters such as: The system’s officials’ perspectives, Friday prayers, Voice and Vision, the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij and the views of the superior commanders, the mosques, political circles, journals and newspapers and internet sites, economic indicators, the bazaar and trade and presence in rural meetings. On this basis, the Political Division organized twice-weekly meetings to categorize the intelligence and news which had been gathered in the presence of the division chief and Mr. Thomas Bern [?] and a classification of final reports was prepared. Along these lines, some measures of this country [Britain] to pursue and provoke the recent riots consist of:

The British Embassy hurried to watch the news of reporters, blogs, popular views, the students, the clergy, officers at Voice and Vision, the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij, in order to review Iran’s daily developments, and as the elections approached, the diplomats and local employees began to take trips to the provinces to survey the views of the various Iranian ethnic groups towards the candidates they were interested in;
Widespread intelligence activity by the British to gather information about disturbances and riots after the elections so that the virtually constantly dispatched local employees to the scenes of the fighting and pursued intelligence-gathering, while these local employees were instructed to get in touch with political parties and gather their analyses and perspectives and report on them;
After the results of the elections were determined, the British embassy hurried to outline the publication of false reports about electoral fraud, and while announcing that they were falsified and that ballots were forged, they made riots and illegal meetings out to be protests and the right of the people. Holding a meeting by the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the presence of oppositional grouplets (such as the Hypocrites [Organization of People’s Mojahedin]) in London after the riots were formed, in which it was determined that the following strategy would be put on the agenda of the protesters and the opposition:
1. The continuation of the riots and illegal gatherings (particularly after the holding of the Friday prayer of 29/3/88 [June 19, 2009]);
2. Open non-participation of the opposition grouplets; [?]
3. Distinguishing the protesters from the line of violence (under the title of civil disobedience);
The participation of all the British embassy diplomats in illegal marches and assemblies after the elections;
One of the accused in the recent events confessed under the interrogation of about his illegal presence along with his wife in a meeting supporting Mr. Karubi in Saadatabad, his presence in illegal meetings of Mir Hosein Musavi’s supporters in Saadatabad and Gisha and in the presence of Lex Penfield, the First Political Secretary, and Thomas Bern, the Second Political Secretary, who was expelled from the country after the recent events. On 24/3/88 [June 14, 2009] in Sanai street, during a fight and a riot around Motahhari and Shariati Streets during the riot and arrest of some of the protesters, the presence of Samuel Morgan, a diplomat of the Public Relations Section in 25/3/88 [June 15, 2009] in Revolution Street in an illegal march, the participation of Paul Blami [?], aid to the Visa Section (expelled from the country) on 28/3/88 [June 17, 2009] in Ferdawsi Square and photographing rallies of that day, the presence of Samuel Morgan on 27/3/88 [June 16, 2009] in Karim Khan Street during an illegal march were confessed to. (Hosein Rasam, interrogation of 6/4/88 [June 27, 2009], pp. 12 and 13);

Similarly, a number of the accused openly confessed that Alex Penfield, the embassy’s First Political Secretary asked them to go to the Beharestan Square and report their observations in the course of Mr. Musavi’s illegal meetings at the Beharestan. (Arash Momenian, Hosein Rasam)
The British ambassador asked local employees to review and report the situation in the other cities.
Before the elections, Alex Penfield and one of the local employees of the Political Section met with several members of the Central Office of one of the protesting candidates as well as with several individuals tied to parties and officers of some NGOs. After the elections, too, on 4/4/88 [June 25, 2009], Mr. Penfield met with one of the individuals who made the reformists’ political plans [?] in the embassy’s VIP consular section (while obtaining a visa) and discussed the candidates for the election and the events after it and the historical Friday prayer sermons of 29/3/88 [June 18, 2009]. (Hosein Rasam, interrogation of 9/4/88 [June 30, 2009], pp. 17 and 18)

Setting aside a budget of 300 pounds to pay domestic NGOs.
Helping these NGOs could organize a coordinated channel of NGOs to benefit from the crisis conditions.
Identifying elements accessible through ILETS. In this way, the British embassy tried to identify influential individuals and prepare the means to exploit them in critical times.
Efforts towards distributing films in the embassy which did not have permission for distribution with the intention of attracting film directors and producers to be able to exploit them when needed.
Creating a VIP section in the Visa Section in order to exploit individuals who have access to various circles in the country and to get close to them on the excuse of holding visa interviews.
The embassy’s diplomatic efforts to establish relations with ethnic and cultural leaders in order to identify and attract them for the sake of desirable goals.
The presence of embassy diplomats in the country’s various regions under the cover of students of Persian and establishing relations with the people of the region.
Preparing the grounds for attracting political-cultural personalities in Britain for the sake of interests under consideration. (Ataollah Mohajerani)
British intelligence-research institutions’ establishing relations with domestic intelligence-research centers to exert influence. (Chatham House, IISS)
Filling America’s and Israel’s intelligence vacuum through the British in order to compensate for the absence of America from Iran.
Establishing relations with political leaders, parties, and personalities with the intent of gathering intelligence and preparations with the intent of cooperating with that country’s [Intelligence] Service.
Contact with network and press proprietors with the aim of exerting influence on the framework of society.

The role of the state news channel the BBC in the events after the presidential elections:
The state news agency BBC, which works under the supervision of the World Service and whose budget is secured by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has for two years, by choosing and dispatching reporters and ordinary people under the cover of the [BBC] Trust, begun to dispatch these individuals in various groups to Turkey and Dubai to give them specialized training and, through this training, be able to spread so-called citizen journalism³ and, by selecting talented people from among these individuals, choose the forces they need for other branches of the BBC and, ultimately, guide and utilize individual with connections within the country.
The Trust’s budget, which is secured by a number of European countries through the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has reached 30 million dollars. The BBC has started to found a Persian-language television station after it began its activities and in order to create widespread change. It began its activity in Dey last year (1387) [December 2008-January 2009]. Most of the people chosen to work on this station have passed through terms of training in this Trust and are reporters of media which criticizes the system.
The BBC Persian service, with the purposeful measures that it pursued, began to establish widespread relations with some domestic document forgers and they gathered their works which lacked permission and worth for distribution. Then, with the program Your Turn, whose principle leader was someone who had been arrested during the disturbances of 18 Tir [July 9] and is a primary party to the [BBC] Trust who spent some time in prison, it began to create strife and difficulties in the country and exaggerate domestic difficulties and political difficulties.
Before the elections, BBC Persian television made special preparations to set the tone for coverage of the anniversary of Tir 18 [July 9] to provoke the people and the students and in this way create disturbances. On the even of the presidential election’s being held, BBC Persian sowed the seeds of sedition and talk about electoral fraud by inviting some recalcitrant and problematic elements and paying them for a month’s stay in London as well as money for holding political roundtables.
In the field of the presidential elections, even before BBC Persian television was launched, the question of whether it was possible to send reporters to Iran was repeatedly raised by that news channel, how it could be disguised, etc. The result of all these plans on the one hand and the special conditions which arose before the elections on the other caused the BBC to prepare itself to take interventionist measures in the Islamic Republic.
By making widespread preparations on the day of the election, BBC Persian television ran its program 24 hours a day and established relations with problematic people in the country to transfer news reports moment by moment.
The guidance announced by foreigners on continuing the protests over the tenth presidential electoral results were:

Emphasizing the continuation of the protests and not accepting the election’s outcome until they yielded the desired results;
Calling the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij elements of a military coup and stating the necessity to drive these forces from the scene. (It will be noted that the statements of various countries about violations of human rights, the need for international observers, etc. should be evaluated in this context and eliminating the popular Basij forces from the scene has been emphasized in the reports guided by the American intelligence and security forces.);
Creating distinctions between religious and non-religious spheres;
Exaggerating differences between various social layers and emphasizing the lack of support of some leaders of the electoral results;
Emphasizing the support of the opponents and protesters by some leaders and celebrities;
Intensifying pressure with the aim of getting the president to resign;

B) Measures by the counter-revolutionary and terrorist grouplets and their role in the events after the recent elections and disturbances.
Since as a result of the historical letter of His Eminence the Imam (God’s mercy be upon him!), the Freedom Movement grouplet was driven from the country’s political sphere to the margins and its threats against the Islamic Revolution’s foundations have become more remote, but this grouplet has from the beginning of the revolution to this day struggled in its various ups and downs to destroy the fruit of the blood of thousands of martyrs and self-sacrificing people by insisting on their own policies of overthrow. The above-mentioned grouplet has, with its more active entry into the country’s political sphere in the course of the past two years, tried to make itself out to the foreign countries as well as domestic recalcitrant groups to be an important successor to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s government in such a way that in this period, the grouplet’s General Secretary made trips to America, Germany, etc. In the following, we point out some of the Freedom Movement’s positions taken and measures of the past two years:

The Freedom Movement’s positions after the trip of Mr. Ebrahim Yazdi (the organizational head of the illegal grouplet) to America (from 30/11/86 [February 19, 2008] to the end of 5/3/87 [May 5, 2008]) adopted a sharper tone so that after years of meetings in the grouplet’s political office, he clearly posed “a strategy of regime change”, albeit “peacefully”, as Yazdi adds, thus making it a soft coup;
Mr. Yazdi, after his return from America, brazenly and exaggeratedly took aim at the principle pillars of the system and has put a strategy of attacking the velayat-e faqih with the goal of breaking the system’s sanctities on its agenda. In an interview dated 23/3/87 [May 23, 2008] on the news site Rooz, he stated, “Now is the time to evaluate the record of the system based on the velayat-e faqih system. We believe that Iran’s basic problem is in the system of the velayat-e faqih.
Last Mordad [July-August], the Organization of the Mojaheds of the Revolution invited leaders of the Freedom Movement grouplet to participate in and speak at its Twelfth Congress, and Mr. Ebrahim Yazdi stated in the weekly organizational meeting in this regard, “Your Servant had been invited to the congress and I even gave a message and it was read in the meeting. We must learn from the past to be able to agree to advancing reforms.”
Mr. Ebrahim Yazdi said on the joint bonds between the Freedom Movement and the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution and the Participation Party, said, “We are glad that political groups are calmly approaching reality. Groups which ten years ago had created lines between themselves and the rest have now come to the conclusion that these boundaries are not realistic. The Kargozaran of today are different from the one of ten years past … There was a time when the Mojaheds of the Islamic Revolution were not in a situation where they could sit down with the Freedom Movement. But in their congress of this year, they invited us and we participated.”
This grouplet, for its part, in its message to the Participation Party considered organized political participation, the development and growth of political parties and organizations to be needed to strengthen the call for democratization in the country. “The totalitarians’ multilayered and convoluted plans can only succeed when political parties have not the possibility to discuss and come to an understanding on how to cooperate with each other.”
The Participation Party’s youth branch, too, invited Mohammad Tavassoli (president of the Freedom Movement’s Political Department) to speak in this party’s meeting hall. Tavassoli said in 1386 [2007-2008], “One must work more on political currents. For example, we must invest in participation so that it will have a broad effect.”
In a consultation meeting of oppositional currents of Azar 1386 [November-December 2007] which hosted the Freedom Movement grouplet and was held in the presence of representatives from illegal grouplets, the Clubs for Strengthening Unity, the Office for Strengthening, influential counter-revolutionaries, elements indicating similar policies, Abdollah Nuri, [Head of the Sixth Majlis Commission Article 90 Hosein] Ansarirad, etc. , the following issue was emphasized: The problem in the country today is not [Mr.—author] Ahmadinejad, but the principle of the velayat-e faqih, and the focus of our attack must be on it. It was similarly posed in this meeting that some of the system’s leaders were cooperating with them in this course;
The Freedom Movement grouplet actively participated in the recent elections as opposed to previous terms and, by supporting Messrs. Musavi and Karubi, they expressed their expectation of effecting fundamental change in the country through these individuals.
Along these lines, the Freedom Movement, after holding meetings with officials of Messrs. Musavi and Karubi’s staff, while finishing agreements of cooperation, ordered many of its elements in Tehran and the provinces to be present in Mr. Mir Hosein Musavi’s staff so that it could thereby, in the presence of Emad Bahavar, the president of the group’s youth branch, in Staff 88 of Mr. Musavi indicated that he, to, had employed many elements of the members of the youth branch in this staff.
In addition to the Freedom Movement, other counter-revolutionary eclectic groups claiming to support human rights held activities intent on preparing the grounds for creating and spreading riots after the elections in cooperation with Western countries.

Statements by some counter-revolutionary leaders and grouplets:
Some of the counter-revolutionary leaders and grouplets tried during the days of electoral rivalry, by making insinuations about fraud and an electoral coup, to set the stage for disturbances after the elections so that in the meantime one might point to the leadership of the Freedom Movement grouplet and Keyvan Samimi (member and a founder of the self-declared Committee for the Defence of Free, Sound, and Just Elections [http://www.humanrights-ir.org/php/view_en.php?objnr=270]).
In the military fields, armed counter-revolutionary grouplets, from the groups of the communist and socialist left to the eclectic currents and the cruel-hearted Hypocrites [OPMI] and separatist ethnic currents with their support of their Western masters have poured the blood of thousands of individual people on the ground.
An interesting point concerning the Hypocrites is that this grouplet was removed from the list of list of terrorist groups in a premeditated move and in an agreement between the Western governments and the Hypocrites. This move was in fact a step towards legitimizing them and giving them room to maneuver to carry out their regime change policies in the context of the tenth term of presidential elections for the Islamic Republic of Iran. An important point in this regard is that the first country to take this step and remove the Hypocrites from the list of terrorist groups was Britain, whose fingerprints can be seen here and there in the recent troubles.
The terrorist grouplet, the Hypocrites, once more feel into gross error as in years past due to its stubborn opposition to the sacred Islamic system and lack of acquaintance with the country’s internal situation. This grouplet gained influence in the electoral staffs of Messrs. Mir Hosein Musavi and Karubi after great effort. (semi-classified file 570/85/88) Similarly, they laid plans for months before to organize craftsmen’s protests of electoral rivalry and to intensify the differences between the candidates’ supporters. But the pride-inspiring participation of 85% of the wise people of Islamic Iran in the elections foiled the Hypocrites’ plots and schemes.
Elements of the Hypocrite grouplet, by exerting all its might, sen in trained teams to create chaos and ride the wave and encourage demonstrations to take violent measures and terrorism. This grouplet, by issuing one statement after another by its leaders and their widespread publication through satellite channels and the internet, tried to spread the scope and continue the disturbances and riots. In this connection, consider the grouplet’s leaders’ message issued on 27 Khordad and 18 Tir 1388 [June 17 and July 9, 2009]:

Yes, now you, woman and man, have fought and have risen up in every street and alley and cry out, just as [Hypocrite leader Maryam Rajavi—author] announced, one must strongly greet the annulment of the elections of this regime. Free elections must be held under the United Nations on the basis of the principle of government by the people … 27 Khordad 1388 [June 17, 2009].

[There must be l]ightning demonstrations at all times and in every place, particularly in sensitive points and points empty of the enemy’s repressive forces. Even under circumstances in which there is no possibility to rally, nuclei of nine people, five people, or even nuclei of resistance of only three young revolutionaries can divide, tire, and exhaust the enemy’s repressive forces. Small nuclei are the driving motor and path-breakers for bigger gatherings. The separate nuclei and teams should not neglect preparations and [ترابرى] and medical aid and communications, to the degree possible. (18 Tir 1388 [July 19, 2009])

Similarly, the above-mentioned grouplet gave some of its contacts, which had previously seen terrorist training in Camp Ashraf in Iraq and had been sent into the country with specific purposes, an agenda of carrying out terrorist measures including setting fire to buses, banks, [and] telephone kiosks and attacking the security forces’ military and Basij forces’ centers. Along the same lines, one of the most basic bases of the terroristic grouplets, the Hypocrites stationed in Britain (with telephone number 00442032398487), was to take charge of leading teams for domestic terror and riot and, while announcing a line of armed struggle and creating chaos in the country and provoking the protesters to raise extreme slogans against the authorities and basic pillars of the system and by spreading distrust of the system among the people, prepare the way for creating division between the authorities and the people and to ignore any way of actually achieving these goals. The important statements of classified file 11597/88 dal tet has this to say on the matter:

From Mehr 1386 [September-October 2007], via one of the supporters of the group I established contact with them (the Hypocrites) and in Dei [December 2007-January 2008] of that year I was illegally smuggled by that grouplet’s contacts to Iraq and received various kinds of training, such as computer work, propaganda operations, recruiting forces, ideological classes, intelligence-gathering, terroristic operations, etc., in that camp and was illegally dispatched to enter the country to execute my missions and returned. During this period, they deposited into my account a sum of a million four hundred thousand tumans for me to carry out the operations and my contact deposited it. Among the foci of my mission in the elections was to gather information and intelligence from electoral stations and get pictures and films and send them to the Hypocrites. After the riots began, they emphasized that I be present on the scenes of the fighting. On 27/3/88 [June 17, 2009], my contact, named Zohreh, contacted me from number 00442032398487 and said, “All the people of Iran have personal problems … but what is the root of the problems? … They must be uprooted … Now I think it is the time. One must not sit hands folded … We are ready to help you. So armed warfare is our cry of the day … Go to your friends and set something on fire, somewhere where the Basij is. Gather five or six of you and go stealthily and set their base on fire. Carry gas and throw a [Molotov] cocktail and ignite the gas pumps near them, the same with public buses … Get the people to come down and then set the middle of the road on fire … [بعد وسط خيابون آتش بزنيد]

In this connection, a number of the grouplet’s contacts who were lead by the Hypocrites and on the scene to create chaos and make trouble and were killed or wounded during the clashes, the Hypocrites, in accordance with their hypocritical nature, in order to take over some of the demonstrations for their own benefit, held mock memorials for them in Camp Ashraf on 3/5/88 [July 25, 2009].
It is necessary to mention that agents of sedition, intent on gathering intelligence within the country, while paying sums each month to some individuals, worked to deceive them through establishing contacts under such covers as news agencies like Homa News Agency or Iran News Agency, and, similarly, the Committee for the so-called Defense of Human Rights and Political Prisoners, etc.
By the True One’s kindness and generosity and the day and night efforts of the Imam of the Age’s forgotten soldiers, a number of the principle contacts of the grouplet who played an active role in the street fighting have been identified and arrested and the efforts of the Hypocrite terrorists to damage the sacred Islamic system have remained unsuccessful.
The ethnic and separatist groups, for their part, which have struggled for years to ruin this land under the leadership of this country’s sworn enemies, have not remained idle during the presidential election period and have taken it upon themselves to execute other scenarios.
According to documents and the accused, these currents have had on their agenda a variety of terroristic operations under the leadership of the enemy’s intelligence services to create and spread disturbances, but have been arrested by the Ministry of Intelligence before every operation. Below, we indicate some of their operations and programs:
They have gathered in Mr. Karubi’s electoral staff with the intention of gathering intelligence and exerting influence and towards intensifying differences between the candidates’ supporters and inciting riot and planned to set off an explosion during Mr. Mir Hosein Musavi’s speech in the stadium in Tabriz.
It is worth mentioning that two weapons and twenty bombs were found on the accused in this file.
In the cultural sphere, the agents of the enemy’s Cultural NATO, by exploiting their empire of media, are trying to execute coup plans and programs so that in this context, one could point to the activities of Western media in its efforts to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran by exploiting the chaotic atmosphere and the disturbances after the elections for the tenth term of the presidency. The following are worth noting in this regard:
The media operations and psychological operations of Britain and America have made the greatest effort to spread chaos. Between them, the British role is the greater and the most effective. One might dare say that BBC Persian was the most active of the agents provoking the disturbances and this channel’s psychological operations were on a higher level compared to other satellite channels. In reviewing this media’s activities during the days before and after the riots, two completely different aspects of the BBC can be seen. During the days before the disturbances and the days of the electoral rivalries, this channel tried to display the electoral enthusiasm in Iran as well as present the different political viewpoints which existed in the country in order to attract spokesmen. This measure prepared the way for the execution of the next stage of this network’s plan.
In the next stage, during the beginning of the riots, this change was transformed into the rioters’ media and while exaggeratedly presenting news, films, reports, interviews, etc. devoted to the disturbances, launched a psychological war against the Islamic Republic of Iran. The BBC Persian tried in this part of the program for psychological operations to, while raising the issue of electoral fraud, by presenting an atmosphere of epic and emotion, encouraged the viewers to participate in the riots.
This channel, as ever, tries, by broadcasting archive photos related to the riots or whatever new pictures it has, to depict the country as chaotic.
Among the American channels, VOA [Voice of America] has played the greatest role in fanning the flames of riot. This channel, which is, of course, at a lower level and is less professional than the BBC, has pursued two goals by before the electoral competition, has two goals on its agenda by choosing destructive methods:

Destroying the credibility and legitimacy of the elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran by depicting them as anti-democratic;
Destroying the president’s image and credibility;

After the elections and with the beginning of the riots, this network also worked, by presenting tendentious news, to hold interviews with fugitive counter-revolutionary elements, etc., and depict the rioters’ movement as a popular movement in order to overthrow the Islamic system.
In addition to the above-mentioned networks, there are the networks tied to the counter-revolutionary grouplets which, through the Western country’s financial and technical support, are engaged in activity and compliment the role of the BBC and the VOA.
The Western countries, in addition to activity in the television networks, are also active in the realm of the internet and have presented [internet] services to the rioters, some of which are as follows:

Contributing for public use software to translate English to Persian and vice versa.
Presenting advanced software for viewing films related to the riots on low-speed internet;
Presenting filter-breaking programs appropriate for the Iranian network structure;
Providing service by the Twitter Company for Iranian spokesmen. (This American company delayed its day of service upgrading, which required it to be down for several days on June 20, 2009, with the aim of supporting and providing service for the rioters;
Activating the American company Face Book in order to ease contacts between Iranian users and those of other countries. This company provided its own trial version in Persian on the occasion of the riots so that the rioters could use it better;

Spread the grouplet’s media channel by using television and internet space;
Eliminating religion from the thoughts of the viewers, listeners, and contacts with the aim of their confronting the religious and divine government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and converting these individuals into the enemy’s pawns to overthrow the sacred system of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
Presenting military and intelligence training to individuals they have attracted to create and increase an operational ability against the Islamic Republic of Iran;
Utilize attracted elements to carry out intelligence operations for the sake of the aims of the enemy’s intelligence services as well as the grouplet’s aims and programs;
Identify and carry out intelligence operations against elements and forces supporting the system with the object of assassination;
Planning to execute terrorist operations;
Creating panic and terror in the country by carrying out terrorist operations of mass murder with the aim of leaving a maximum of killed in these actions and creating an irreparable crisis in the country;
Planning the assassination of political figures and thinkers and theoreticians, etc. in society
The Royalist Society grouplet, based on the afore-mentioned policies, planted a bomb and carried out terroristic operations in the Hoseinia of His Holiness the Lord of Martyrs in Shiraz in Farvardin 1387 [April 2008]. In this operation, fourteen ritual mourners in the Hoseinia were martyred and over two hundred were wounded. Some of the martyrs were even infants and invalids.⁵
Among this Royalist Society grouplet’s operations the was the use of the electoral atmosphere to advance the grouplet’s regime-change goals in the context of America’s, Britain’s, and Israel’s strategy on this matter, which has the following program put on its internal agenda by the enemy’s intelligence services and the leaders of the grouplets:
1. Gather intelligence on the electoral atmosphere of the tenth presidential elections.
2. Gather intelligence on Islamic Revolutionary Guards and the Basij.
3. Identify important and crowded centers with the aim of planting bombs.
4. Identify and execute necessary operations to prepare planting bombs and carrying out terroristic operations in two crowded centers for casting votes, the Tehran Hoseiniye Ershad and the Narmak’s an-Nabi Mosque.
5. Planting bombs in crowded centers such as the Hazrat Ali Akbar (Upon whom be peace!) Chizar Shrine and the Zaid (Upon whom be peace!) Shrine in the Tehran Bazaar.
6. Planting bombs in the Hoseiniaye Fatemiyun in Mojahedin Street.
7. Using chemical and poison bombs in crowded centers.
8. Identifying sensitive government centers for planting bombs.
9. Identifying important fuel and food depots.
10. Planning to pollute Tehran’s water supply with highly powerful toxins.
11. Present training to the rioters so they can expand the scope of the riots as follows:
  1. Training in forming nuclei of struggle;
  2. Training in the principles of intelligence;
  3. Training in making bombs and hand-made grenades;
  4. Training in confronting the anti-riot police;
  5. Training in partisan warfare;
  6. Training in making electronic shock devices;
  7. Training in making teargas sprays and the means of resisting them;
  8. Training in eavesdropping and countering eavesdropping;
  9. Training in getting around filtering and countering ways of being identified online;
  10. Training in evading jamming devices;
  11. Training in pursuing and countering being pursued;
  12. Training in working with weapons;
The above-mentioned items speak of how the terroristic Royalist Society grouplet has, over the past two years, acted towards the overthrow of the sacred system of the Islamic Republic of Iran and how the members of this grouplet, aware of the situation, have acted in accord with the goals of the intelligence services of the enemy and leaders of the grouplet.
Similarly, existing indicators show that this grouplet entered the field to urge on the rioters during the post-election riots on the basis of a plan laid by the enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a piece of the puzzle for a velvet coup as one of the powerful arms of the regime-change current to bring the strength of the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran into question and create a widespread and irreparable crisis. We can take, for instance, the plan to explode a bomb in His Holiness the late Imam’s shrine in 30/3/88 [June 20, 2009] by someone named Bizhan Abbasi, who was killed through the officers’ alertness before he could approach the sacred grave of the Imam (God’s mercy be upon him!) and died in the explosion.
The most important foreigner[s] in the case of the Royalist Society are:
1. Jamshid Sharmehr. He was one of the grouplet’s leaders and was based in Los Angeles, America. He was the contact between the CIA and the Royalist Society and played an essential role in the grouplet;
2. Emanuel Afar. He was originally Jewish and an officer in Mossad and lives in America and Israel;
3. Dardaneh Manuchehr. He is based in London, England and is the grouplet’s contact with the British Intelligence Service;⁶
It is necessary to note that after the explosion in the Hoseinia of the Lord of Martyrs in Shiraz, a red alert was sent out by the [dastgah-e faza'i] and presented to the international police. Unfortunately, the American an British police (despite their participation in terrorist acts and the acceptance of this matter in the media), they did not offer any cooperation in arresting and turning in the accused:
An explanation of the charges of each of the accused is reflected in the file and their indictment the proofs of the charge and the degree of culpability of each of them in the recent sedition is enumerated.
Assistant to the Revolutionary Public Prosecutor

Notes:
0 For background on the PressTV
and Mohammad Sahim at Tehran Bureau Tehran Bureau.
Coverage by Enduring America continues to be excellent.
We always aprreciate a thumbs up from our friends at the National Iranian-American Council, especially if it comes with some good commentary on our posts. Thanks.

1 It is unclear to what program he is referring. The weakness of these exchange programs has been deplored in different venues. Here are two examples.

2
Here are several illuminating discussions of this issue. Here about this program.
3 There have been many discussions of this project of the BBC’s. See here and here. The author of the indictment “forgets” that this budget was zeroed out right before the elections. See also this one.4 There is little evidence that such a society exists.5 The allegations attributing this to a monarchist group seems dubious; at the time, no mention was made of monarchists. The Wikipedia article echoes this claim, but the sources it sites on this make no mention of it, either. A Google search turns up nothing about this shadowy outfit.6 A Google search on these names only turn up the recent charges against them.

Source:
http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8805170594

Comments:
Stay tuned.

Tags: Ali Khamenei, Aspen Institute, Ataollah Mohajerani, Basij, BBC, Britain, British Council, British intelligence, Camp Ashraf, Chewning Scholarships, CIA, citizen journalism, Dardaneh Manuchehr, Dubai, Ebrahim Yazdi, Elections, Electoral Fraud, Emad Bahavar, Emanuel Afar, Executives_of_Construction_Party, Freedom House, Freedom Movement, Gaza, Gozar, Hosein Ansari-Rad, Hosein Rasam, Human Rights, internet, Iran, Iranian Affairs Office, Islamic Participation Party, Islamic Republic, Israel, Jamshid Sharmehr, Lebanese Hezbollah, Mehdi Karroubi, Mehdi Karubi, Meridian Foundation, Mir Hosein Musavi, Mojahedin, Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution, Mossad, Nazi Beglari, NGO, Non-Governmental Organization, public diplomacy, Revolutionary Guards, Royalist Society, Said Mortazavi, soft coup, Soros Foundation, velayat-e faqih, Voice and Vision, Voice of America
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